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Abstract: In July 2017 the U.S. Food and Drug Administration announced a 
new “comprehensive plan for tobacco and nicotine regulation.” This plan fo-
cuses on making cigarettes less addictive while facilitating the development of 
alternative, and less-harmful, nicotine-containing products. This approach 
holds promise, and the public health stakes could not be higher—smoking is 
the leading cause of preventable death in the United States, resulting in rough-
ly 480,000 deaths per year. But a new consumer product is emerging that 
could upset the FDA’s plans for a well-balanced regulatory scheme: synthetic 
nicotine. Synthetic nicotine products currently fall into a regulatory gap be-
cause they do not appear to meet the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s 
definition of a tobacco product. If this gap remains in place, it is likely that 
more companies will choose to market synthetic nicotine products in order to 
evade regulation, undoing the potential benefits of the FDA’s plan for tobacco 
and nicotine regulation. This Article argues that the FDA can, and should, ad-
dress this problem by regulating synthetic nicotine products as drugs. After 
reviewing the science of nicotine addiction and the FDA’s past and present 
regulatory schemes for nicotine, this Article explains how the FDA could es-
tablish that synthetic nicotine products are drugs under the FDCA’s definition. 
This Article then concludes with a discussion of the policy benefits of catego-
rizing synthetic nicotine products as drugs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In July 2017, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) Com-
missioner, Scott Gottlieb, announced a new “comprehensive plan for tobac-
co and nicotine regulation,” intended to “place[] nicotine, and the issue of 
addiction, at the center of the agency’s tobacco regulation efforts.”1 The 
FDA’s plan recognizes that although nicotine use carries some risks, it is 
“not directly responsible for the cancer, lung disease, and heart disease that 
kill hundreds of thousands of Americans each year.”2 Nicotine makes to-
bacco products addictive, but it is these products’ other toxic and carcino-
genic components, combined with their addictive properties, that make 
them deadly.3 Cigarettes are particularly lethal: they kill more than half of 
their long-term users.4 But because cigarettes are extremely effective at de-
livering nicotine quickly to the brain, they are also by far the most popular 
tobacco product.5 
Based on these insights, the FDA is proposing a “Nicotine-Focused 
Framework for Public Health” that seeks to make the most deadly forms of 
tobacco use (i.e., cigarettes and other combustible products) less addictive 
while simultaneously encouraging the development of less harmful ways to 
deliver nicotine to those already addicted.6 These are laudable aims, and the 
public health stakes could not be higher. Smoking is currently the leading 
cause of preventable death in the United States, resulting in roughly 480,000 
deaths per year—appreciably more deaths than other high-profile, significant 
public health problems, such as drug misuse and overdose.7 If cigarettes were 
gradually phased out and replaced by less harmful forms of nicotine use, it is 
                                                                                                                           
 1 News Release, FDA Announces Comprehensive Regulatory Plan to Shift Trajectory of To-
bacco-Related Disease, Death, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 28, 2017) [hereinafter FDA Compre-
hensive Plan], https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm568923.
htm [https://perma.cc/V9XW-AJB7]. 
 2 Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Protecting American Families: Com-
prehensive Approach to Nicotine and Tobacco (July 28, 2017) (emphasis added), https://www.fda.
gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm569024.htm [https://perma.cc/H6DM-YVC8]. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Scott Gottlieb & Mitchell Zeller, A Nicotine-Focused Framework for Public Health, 377 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1111, 1111 (2017). 
 5 See id. 
 6 Id. at 1111–12. 
 7 See Smoking & Tobacco Use: Fast Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(updated Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/fast_facts/index.
htm [https://perma.cc/6JAL-E33L] (documenting number of tobacco related deaths); Overdose 
Death Rates, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (updated Sept. 2017), https://www.drugabuse.gov/
related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates [https://perma.cc/2E2T-4PB2] (logging the 
total number of drug related deaths in the United States in 2017 at around 64,000). 
1936 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1933 
quite possible that “the great majority of tobacco-caused diseases and deaths 
will disappear . . . .”8 
The 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“TCA”), 
which granted the FDA powerful regulatory tools for tobacco products, repre-
sented an important step toward addressing this public health problem.9 Alt-
hough the health harms of tobacco use have been well established for dec-
ades, it was not until passing the TCA that Congress gave the FDA broad au-
thority to regulate the manufacture, sale, and marketing of tobacco products. 
In 2016, the FDA finalized a rule (referred to as the “Deeming Rule”) that 
extended its regulatory authority to all products meeting the TCA’s statutory 
definition of a tobacco product, notably including electronic cigarettes (“e-
cigarettes”).10 Between the TCA and the later Deeming Rule, the FDA now 
has the authority to regulate all products “made or derived from tobacco that 
[are] intended for human consumption . . . .”11 
If the FDA is seeking to “comprehensively” regulate nicotine, howev-
er, there is still a notable regulatory gap: synthetic nicotine.12 In just the past 
                                                                                                                           
 8 Richard A. Daynard, Doing the Unthinkable (and Saving Millions of Lives), 18 TOBACCO 
CONTROL 2, 2 (2009). 
 9 See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 
1776 (2009). 
 10 See Deeming Tobacco Products to Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act; Restrictions on 
the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required Warning Statements for Tobacco 
Products, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,974, 28,974 (May 10, 2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1100, 
1140, 1143) [hereinafter Deeming Rule]. As might be expected, the FDA’s decision to deem all 
products meeting the TCA’s definition of a tobacco product to be subject to its scheme for tobacco 
regulation is not without its critics—both from those who think it oversteps the government’s 
proper role and from those who think it does not go far enough to protect public health. See Micah 
L. Berman & Y. Tony Yang, E-cigarettes, Youth, and the US Food and Drug Administration’s 
“Deeming” Regulation, 170 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1039, 1039 (2016) (taking the latter approach); 
Jonathan H. Adler, Why FDA Regulations Limiting E-cigarette Marketing May Cost Lives and Vio-
late the Constitution, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2017/12/12/why-fda-regulations-limiting-e-cigarette-marketing-may-cost-lives-and-
violate-the-constitution/?utm_term=.819c00cea3ee [https://perma.cc/QPA6-PVPZ] (taking the for-
mer approach). The merits of the Deeming Rule, however, are outside the scope of this Article. 
 11 Deeming Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. at 28,976. The definition also includes components, parts, and 
accessories of tobacco products and excludes products that are classified as drugs or devices under 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, even if those products are made or derived from tobacco. Id. 
 12 Currently, the only nicotine not made or derived from tobacco that appears to be sold for 
human consumption is synthetic nicotine. There are, however, other potential non-tobacco nico-
tine sources. For example, tomatoes, eggplants, and other vegetables contain nicotine in small 
quantities. See, e.g., Michelle Castillo, Eating Nicotine-Containing Produce Like Peppers, Toma-
toes May Lower Parkinson’s Risk, CBS NEWS (May 9, 2013), https://www.cbsnews.
com/news/eating-nicotine-containing-produce-like-peppers-tomatoes-may-lower-parkinsons-risk/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z3ZA-CG84]. Although it may not be economically feasible to derive nicotine 
from these sources at this time, if the FDA decides to regulate synthetic nicotine as a drug, it 
can—and should—make clear that its authority covers all non-tobacco sources of nicotine intend-
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few years, synthetic nicotine—which is synthesized through chemical reac-
tions in a lab—has entered the consumer marketplace, primarily as an in-
gredient for use in e-cigarette liquids.13 The sellers of such synthetic nico-
tine products celebrated the FDA’s acknowledgement that it may not be able 
to regulate such products under the TCA, because they are not “made or 
derived from tobacco . . . .”14 This leaves a regulatory gap that may become 
much more significant as the FDA begins to regulate e-cigarettes and as the 
price of synthetic nicotine continues to fall. 
Sellers of synthetic nicotine products, though, are perhaps celebrating 
their escape from regulatory oversight prematurely. Although the FDA is 
                                                                                                                           
ed for drug uses, to deter future attempts to evade regulation. Likewise, the tobacco industry has 
long conducted research regarding the possibility of developing nicotine analogues “to circumvent 
. . . nicotine regulation.” Rosemary Vagg & Simon Chapman, Nicotine Analogues: A Review of 
Tobacco Industry Research Interests, 100 ADDICTION 701, 701 (2005); see also STANTON A. 
GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 97–100 (1996) (describing the tobacco industry’s inter-
est in nicotine analogues). The FDA, therefore, might also make clear that products containing 
nicotine analogues may be subject to regulation as drugs. For the purposes of this Article, synthet-
ic nicotine is specifically addressed, but all arguments and policy implications apply with equal 
force to any other non-tobacco sources of nicotine and nicotine analogues that are intended for 
drug uses. 
 13 Although synthetic nicotine has long been sold in products not intended for human con-
sumption, such as insecticides, it is only recently that the substance has been marketed for human 
consumption in e-liquids and other products. See, e.g., Florence F. Wagner & Daniel L. Comins, 
Recent Advances in the Synthesis of Nicotine and Its Derivatives, 63 TETRAHEDRON 8065, 8065, 
8080 (2007). When this Article refers to “synthetic nicotine” or “synthetic nicotine products,” it is 
generally referring only to products intended for human consumption. 
 14 21 U.S.C. § 321(rr)(1) (2012); see also Matt Rowland, Will Synthetic Nicotine Save Vaping 
Industry from FDA E-Cig Regulations?, VAPES (June 28, 2016), https://www.vapes.com/blogs/
news/will-synthetic-nicotine-save-vaping-industry-from-fda-e-cig-regulations# [https://perma.cc/
BMQ9-4KFW] (asserting that the FDA does not regulate synthetic nicotine products as tobacco 
products). There might be a colorable argument that, by giving the FDA jurisdiction over products 
“made or derived from tobacco,” Congress intended the FDA to regulate as tobacco products all 
tobacco-like products, including synthetic nicotine products. Indeed, synthetic nicotine is chemi-
cally identical to tobacco-derived nicotine, there do not appear to be scientific or public health 
reasons for regulating it differently than tobacco-derived nicotine, and in many instances courts 
have been willing to construe the FDA’s statute broadly in light of the agency’s public health 
mission. See infra notes 103–114, 211–230 and accompanying text. There are obvious legal vul-
nerabilities to the agency interpreting “tobacco product” to include synthetic nicotine products, 
however, because the plain language of the statute defines tobacco products as those “made or 
derived from tobacco . . . .” 21 U.S.C. § 321(rr)(1). This Article does not analyze whether the 
FDA could advance such an interpretation. Rather, this Article demonstrates that the FDA need 
not adopt such a vulnerable interpretation to properly regulate synthetic nicotine products because 
there is a strong argument that synthetic nicotine products are drugs. Moreover, as a practical 
matter, the FDA appears to have declined to interpret “tobacco products” so broadly as to include 
nicotine products not derived from tobacco. See Commonly Asked Questions: About the Center for 
Tobacco Products, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/AbouttheCenterforTobaccoProducts/ucm
378205.htm#14 [https://perma.cc/CUC5-3V37]. 
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likely unable to regulate synthetic nicotine products as tobacco products 
under the TCA, the agency could potentially regulate them as drugs under 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).15 To establish that a 
synthetic nicotine product is a drug, the FDA would have to show that the 
product is “intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or 
prevention of disease” or “intended to affect the structure or any function of 
the body . . . .”16 The FDA’s authority to regulate synthetic nicotine prod-
ucts as a drug thus hinges on the meaning of “intended use” and the kinds 
of evidence that the FDA may use to demonstrate a product’s intended 
use—issues that have long been controversial. 
This Article argues that the FDA can and should regulate synthetic 
nicotine products as drugs under the FDCA. Diving into the legal history on 
“intended use,” we demonstrate that although the case law on some key 
points remains unsettled, the FDA can make a convincing legal case that 
synthetic nicotine is best characterized as a drug under the FDCA. That is, 
there appears to be good evidence that the sellers of synthetic nicotine prod-
ucts generally intend those products to address disease or affect the structure 
or function of the body.17 Then, as a policy matter, we explore why the FDA 
should regulate synthetic nicotine products as drugs—arguing that such 
regulation would enable the agency to treat like products similarly, protect 
consumers, and encourage research innovation. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background on the 
biological effects of nicotine, the FDA’s history of tobacco and nicotine 
regulation, and the emergence of synthetic nicotine as an ingredient in 
products for consumer nicotine consumption.18 Part II discusses the FDA’s 
legal authority to regulate synthetic nicotine products as drugs.19 Part III 
lays out the public policy and public health reasons for the FDA to do so. 20 
I. HOW WE GOT HERE: UNDERSTANDING NICOTINE AND THE FDA’S 
NICOTINE-RELATED JURISDICTION 
In 1994, the seven major tobacco company CEOs all testified before a 
congressional hearing that they believed nicotine was not addictive.21 This 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1). 
 16 Id. § 321(g)(1)(B). 
 17 See infra notes 133–209 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 21–115 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 116–209 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 210–264 and accompanying text. 
 21 Regulation of Tobacco Products: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env’t 
of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 527 (1994); William B. Schultz, The 
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was, of course, untrue—“[t]he companies themselves had carefully docu-
mented the effects of nicotine on the brain”—but the companies feared that 
acknowledging nicotine’s addictive effects could subject them to FDA regu-
lation.22 
More than twenty years after this historic hearing, the landscape has 
shifted dramatically. The addictiveness of nicotine is no longer in dispute, 
and the FDA now has jurisdiction over tobacco products.23 But the effects 
of nicotine are still widely misunderstood,24 and the rise of e-cigarettes, and, 
more recently, the emergence of synthetic nicotine, continues to present the 
FDA with challenging legal and regulatory decisions.25 
This Part presents the scientific and legal background necessary to ex-
plore whether and how the FDA should regulate synthetic nicotine. It starts 
by examining how nicotine affects the human body26 and how the FDA has 
regulated (or tried to regulate) tobacco and nicotine.27 It then explores how 
e-cigarettes fit into the FDA’s regulatory scheme.28 Finally, it discusses how 
synthetic nicotine threatens to upset the FDA’s efforts to comprehensively 
regulate nicotine.29 
A. Nicotine’s Effects on the Body 
Since the 1950s, the major tobacco companies have been aware that 
nicotine is an addictive substance.30 For instance, in 1963, an internal 
Brown & Williams report recognized that “nicotine is addictive” and the 
company was therefore “in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive 
drug . . . .”31 Likewise, a 1969 Philip Morris report recognized that “the 
primary motivation for smoking is to obtain the pharmacological effect of 
                                                                                                                           
FDA’s Decision to Regulate Tobacco Products, 18 PACE L. REV. 27, 29 (1997); Philip J. Hilts, 
Tobacco Chiefs Say Cigarettes Aren’t Addictive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1994, at A1. 
 22 Schultz, supra note 21, at 33. 
 23 See infra notes 53–80 and accompanying text. 
 24 Jennifer C. Morgan et al., How People Think About the Chemicals in Cigarette Smoke: A 
Systematic Review, 40 J. BEHAVIORAL MED. 553, 557 (2017). 
 25 See infra notes 103–114 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 30–52 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 53–80 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 81–102 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 103–114 and accompanying texts. 
 30 United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 515 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d, 566 
F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Philip Morris”); Schultz, supra note 21, at 33. 
 31 A. YEAMAN, IMPLICATIONS OF BATELLE HIPPO I & II AND THE GRIFFITH FILTER 4 (July 
1963), https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/hrwh0097 [https://perma.cc
/BW2Q-VJN8]. 
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nicotine.”32 But motivated in part by fear of FDA regulation, the industry 
worked to conceal evidence of nicotine’s addictiveness for decades.33 
Despite the industry’s past denials, it is now beyond dispute that 
“[n]icotine is the drug in tobacco that causes addiction.”34 The physiologi-
cal mechanisms are complex, but in short, exposure to nicotine activates the 
nicotine-specific receptors in the brain, and this activation in turn increases 
levels of dopamine and other neurotransmitters.35 Dopamine provides a 
pleasurable sensation, and the reinforcing effects of dopamine create and 
sustain addiction.36 Importantly, the brain adapts to repeated nicotine use, 
increasing one’s tolerance to it, and that increased tolerance for nicotine is 
reflected in physiological changes.37 Specifically, chronic nicotine exposure 
alters the brain’s structure by increasing the number of nicotine-specific 
receptors.38 
Nicotine addiction is characterized by the user’s need to continue dos-
ing, both to maintain the reinforcing effects of nicotine and to reduce the 
incidence of withdrawal symptoms.39 The reinforcing effects of nicotine on 
the brain (and other systems) include increased “relaxation, reduced stress, 
enhanced vigilance, improved cognitive function, mood modulation, and 
lower body weight.”40 Conversely, when withdrawing from nicotine, users 
experience “nervousness, restlessness, irritability, and anxiety . . . .”41 For 
regular smokers, the effects of nicotine can wear off quickly; within thirty 
minutes of smoking, they may already start to feel symptoms of both physi-
cal and psychological withdrawal.42 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See WHY ONE SMOKES 2, 4–11 (1969), https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/
tobacco/docs/tnjm0129 [https://perma.cc/HZ5H-NBV8]. 
 33 Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 653 (“The Defendants [tobacco industry leaders] have 
repeatedly made vigorous and impassioned public denials—before Congressional committees, in 
advertisements in the national print media, and on television—that neither smoking nor nicotine is 
addictive, and that they do not manipulate, alter, or control the amount of nicotine contained in the 
cigarettes they manufacture.”). 
 34 OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH 
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING—NICOTINE ADDICTION: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 9 
(1988), https://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBZD.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXQ3-RE3N]. 
 35 OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH 
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING—50 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 
113 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT], https://www.surgeongeneral.gov/
library/reports/50-years-of-progress/full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/82GF-3TUJ]. 
 36 Id. at 113, 785. 
 37 Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 598–99. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 601; see also 2014 SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 35, at 112. 
 40 Neal L. Benowitz, Pharmacology of Nicotine: Addiction and Therapeutics, 356 ANN. REV. 
OF PHARMACOLOGY & TOXICOLOGY 597, 601 (1996). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 601, 603. 
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In addition to causing addiction and relieving withdrawal symptoms, 
nicotine exposure—apart from the risks associated with other components 
in tobacco—carries its own risks. The World Health Organization has ex-
plained that nicotine “can have adverse effects during pregnancy and may 
contribute to cardiovascular diseases,” and “[a]lthough nicotine itself is not 
a carcinogen, it may function as a tumour promoter.”43 
Moreover, nicotine is particularly harmful for developing brains. For a 
fetus (exposed through maternal nicotine use), nicotine exposure can cause 
cellular damage to the brain that is associated with behavioral challenges 
later in life, including learning disabilities and hyperactivity disorder.44 
Nicotine also restricts the flow of nutrients and oxygen to the fetal tissues, 
which is linked to congenital deformities and impaired cardiac develop-
ment.45 For these reasons and others, nicotine is classified as a developmen-
tal toxicant by the California Environmental Protection Agency.46 
Likewise, adolescents—whose brains are not yet fully developed—are 
particularly vulnerable to nicotine exposure.47 Because nicotine exposure at 
the adolescent age also induces structural changes in the brain, those who 
begin to use tobacco as adolescents are more likely to smoke into adult-
hood, have more difficulty quitting, and experience deeper levels of addic-
tion.48 Other consequences of early nicotine exposure include changes to 
the developing limbic system (the emotional core of the brain), which in-
creases the likelihood of developing mood disorders, attention and cogni-
tion disorders, and drug-seeking behaviors.49 
                                                                                                                           
 43 World Health Org., Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems, 3, FCTC/COP/6/10 (July 21, 
2014), http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop6/FCTC_COP6_10-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9NT-RPJS] 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 44 2014 SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 35, at 119, 121 (citing Theodore A. Slot-
kin, Fetal Nicotine or Cocaine Exposure: Which One Is Worse?, 285 J. PHARMACOLOGY & EX-
PERIMENTAL THERAPEUTICS 931 (1998)). 
 45 See Donna S. Lambers & Kenneth E. Clark, The Maternal and Fetal Physiologic Effects of 
Nicotine, 20 SEMINARS PERINATOLOGY 115, 115 (1996). 
 46 2014 SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 35, at 471. 
 47 Neuroscience research over the past few decades has shown, contrary to earlier assump-
tions, that brain development continues into one’s twenties. See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAU-
RENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 44 (2010) (“Scientists have found clear evi-
dence that the brain continues to mature through adolescence and into the early twenties, with 
large-scale structural change taking place during this period.”). 
 48 OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., E-CIGARETTE 
USE AMONG YOUTH AND YOUNG ADULTS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 105 (2016) [here-
inafter 2016 SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT], https://e-cigarettes.surgeongeneral.gov/documents/
2016_SGR_Full_Report_non-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LKT-9H4L]. 
 49 Eric R. Kandel & Denise B. Kandel, A Molecular Basis for Nicotine as a Gateway Drug, 
371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 932, 941–42 (2014); Menglu Yuan et al., Nicotine and the Adolescent 
Brain, 593 J. PHYSIOLOGY 3397, 3397 (2015). 
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Although the effects outlined above raise public health concerns, nico-
tine itself—separate and apart from tobacco use—may hold promise as a 
treatment for certain medical conditions. For instance, there is some prelim-
inary evidence—albeit sometimes funded or conducted by the tobacco in-
dustry50—that nicotine could be used to treat the symptoms of Alzheimer’s 
disease, Parkinson’s disease, Schizophrenia, and other illnesses.51 
In short, although nicotine is not the primary lethal component of to-
bacco products, it is well known that nicotine use causes addiction as well 
as other negative public health consequences.52 For purposes of FDA regu-
lation, it is notable that it does so by inducing permanent physiological 
changes in the brain. Nicotine, isolated from tobacco, may also hold some 
public health promise. Of course, if a nicotine-containing product were 
marketed as a treatment for a disease or its symptoms, there is no question 
that the FDA would consider it a drug. 
B. The FDA’s History of Using Its Drug-Related Authority  
to Regulate Tobacco and Nicotine 
The FDA oversees drugs throughout their lifecycle, from the start of 
research through their use in clinical care. A critical component of the 
FDA’s regulation of drugs is the agency’s gatekeeping function. A new drug 
cannot be marketed in the United States unless the FDA determines it is 
safe and effective for its proposed use.53 
What constitutes a drug subject to the FDA’s authority? The FDCA de-
fines a “drug” as an “article” that is “intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease” or that is “intended to affect 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Janine K. Cataldo et al., Cigarette Smoking Is a Risk Factor for Alzheimer’s Disease: An 
Analysis Controlling for Tobacco Industry Affiliation, 2010 J. ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE 465, 465–80 
(finding that studies funded by the tobacco industry reported that smoking was protective against 
Alzheimer’s disease, whereas studies without industry funding found that smoking increased the 
risk of Alzheimer’s disease or that there was no clear association); cf. 2014 SURGEON GENERAL’S 
REPORT, supra note 35, at 123 (“Nonindustry-funded authors reported both positive and negative 
findings [on the relationship between nicotine and cognitive performance], while industry-funded 
authors reported positive findings almost exclusively.”). 
 51 2014 SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 35, at 123; see also Benowitz, supra note 
40, at 607. 
 52 See supra notes 39–49 and accompanying text. 
 53 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(d), 355(a)–(d) (2012). “New drugs,” as defined by the FDCA, are those 
drugs that are not generally recognized as safe and effective, or have not been marketed for a ma-
terial time and to a material extent. Id. § 321(p). The overwhelming majority of prescription drugs, 
and many over-the-counter drugs introduced into the market after 1972, are new drugs. See U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MARKETED UNAPPROVED DRUGS—COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE 12 
(Sept. 2011), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/
Guidances/UCM070290.pdf [https://perma.cc/RET7-QSEV]. 
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the structure or any function of the body . . . .”54 Therefore, the “intended 
use” of a product—determined by the “objective intent of the persons legal-
ly responsible for the labeling”55—is the key to determining whether a 
product is a drug within the FDA’s jurisdiction.56 Although the FDA has 
applied commonsense limits to its interpretation of what falls within the 
drug definition, the definition is quite broad.57 It captures products that are 
commonly understood to be drugs—such as cancer therapies—as well as 
products that a lay person or healthcare provider may not intuitively consid-
er to be drugs—such as antiperspirant, which is intended to inhibit the 
body’s sweat function.58 As the Supreme Court has explained, the FDCA 
“define[s] ‘drug’ far more broadly than does the medical profession.”59 
                                                                                                                           
 54 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1). 
 55 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2017); see also id. § 801.4 (providing the same definition for intend-
ed use of devices). The FDA made certain controversial changes to the regulatory definition of 
intended use in 2017. As of the time of writing, the FDA has indefinitely delayed the effective 
date for the contested changes to “allow further consideration.” The agency, however, did not 
change, nor has the industry objected to, this aspect of the definition. Clarification of When Prod-
ucts Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated as Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; 
Amendments to Regulations Regarding “Intended Uses”; Partial Delay of Effective Date, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 11,639, 11,639 (Mar. 16, 2018) [hereinafter 2018 FDA Clarification]; Clarification of When 
Products Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated as Drugs, Devices, or Combination Prod-
ucts, 82 Fed. Reg. 14,320, 14,320–24 (Mar. 20, 2017); Clarification of When Products Made or 
Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated as Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments 
to Regulations Regarding “Intended Uses,” 82 Fed. Reg. 2193, 2198, 2200 (Jan. 9, 2017) [herein-
after January 2017 FDA Clarification]. 
 56 The FDA’s jurisdiction and enforcement authority is also generally linked to a drug’s 
movement (or its components’ movement) in interstate commerce. See 21 U.S.C. § 331; Patricia J. 
Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 IND. L.J. 845, 879–80 (2017). Given modern production 
processes that typically involve at least components crossing state or national borders, and fin-
ished products crossing state and national boundaries to reach customers, this limitation on FDA 
authority is unlikely to be relevant to nicotine products. 
 57 For example, the FDA has explained that, although whole organs intended for transplant 
“fall within the literal language” of the drug definition, the agency does not intend to regulate 
them as drugs for various reasons. Statement by the Food and Drug Administration Concerning Its 
Legal Authority to Regulate Human Organ Transplants and to Prohibit Their Sale: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight, H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 98th Cong. (1983), 
reprinted in PETER HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 939–41 (2013). 
Likewise, in the device context where the FDA’s jurisdiction also largely depends on a product’s 
intended use, the FDA has applied commonsense limitations to its jurisdiction by, for instance, 
declining to construe all exercise equipment—which, of course, is intended to affect the structure 
or function of the body—to be devices. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 890.5350 (2017); see also Physical 
Medicine Devices, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,032, 53,035 (Nov. 23, 1983) (“FDA has changed the regula-
tions classifying many physical medicine devices to clarify that the regulations apply only to those 
products intended for medical purposes.”). 
 58 See PETER HUTT ET AL., supra note 57, at 117. 
 59 United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 793 (1969). 
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Since at least 1984, the FDA has regulated nicotine-containing prod-
ucts intended to assist with smoking cessation as drugs.60 Because of the 
strong causal link between smoking and numerous diseases, the FDA con-
siders sellers’ claims that a product aids in smoking cessation to be evidence 
that the product is “intended for use in the . . . mitigation, treatment, or pre-
vention of disease . . . .”61 Thus, smoking cessation products such as nico-
tine-containing gums, lozenges, and transdermal patches (collectively re-
ferred to as Nicotine Replacement Therapies, or “NRT”) are regulated as 
drugs and require FDA approval before they can be sold.62 
If nicotine is a drug for purposes of NRT, is it also a drug when used in 
tobacco products themselves? The FDA raised this question in 1996, when 
it tried to regulate tobacco products as drug-device combination products. 
1. The 1996 Rule: The FDA’s First Attempt to Regulate Tobacco Products 
In 1996, the FDA tried—ultimately unsuccessfully—to argue that be-
cause nicotine was a drug “intended to affect the structure or any function 
of the body,” it could regulate tobacco products such as cigarettes and 
smokeless tobacco as drug-delivery devices.63 To support this assertion, the 
agency pointed to several categories of evidence: tobacco products do, in 
fact, affect the structure and function of the body in myriad ways; a reason-
able tobacco seller would foresee that consumers will use tobacco products 
to obtain the biological effects of nicotine; and consumers do predominantly 
use tobacco products for their biological effects.64 The FDA also relied 
heavily on what was then recently discovered evidence that the tobacco 
companies knew that nicotine was addictive (despite their public denials) 
and deliberately manipulated nicotine levels in tobacco products in order to 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Drugs@FDA: FDA Approved Drug Products, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.access
data.fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/index.cfm?event=overview.process&ApplNo=018612 [https://perma.
cc/SQ2U-HLGX]. 
 61 January 2017 FDA Clarification, supra note 55, at 2194, 2198, 2214. 
 62 See 21 C.F.R. § 310.544. Notably, NRT products are designed to treat tobacco addiction 
without inducing sustained, long-term use. NRTs have been criticized as being unappealing to 
current smokers precisely because they have been calibrated not to create dependence. Brent 
Caldwell et al., A Systematic Review of Nicotine by Inhalation: Is There a Role for the Inhaled 
Route?, 14 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 1127, 1127 (2012). As of the time of writing, the FDA is 
considering how NRT products, and the agency’s regulation of NRT products, could be improved. 
See The Food and Drug Administration’s Approach to Evaluating Nicotine Replacement Thera-
pies; Public Hearing; Request for Comments, 82 Fed. Reg. 56,759, 56,759 (Nov. 30, 2017). 
 63 See generally DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE 
WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY (2001) (examining in detail the FDA’s attempt to regulate tobacco 
products). 
 64 See id. 
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create and sustain addiction.65 This new evidence, in the FDA’s view, justi-
fied the reversal of its prior position that tobacco products did not qualify as 
drugs under the FDCA.66 
Immediately after the FDA asserted jurisdiction over tobacco products, 
the major tobacco companies filed suit.67 After four years of litigation, in 
2000, a 5–4 majority of the Supreme Court ruled in FDA v. Brown & Wil-
liamson that the FDA lacked the authority to regulate tobacco products as 
drugs or devices when those tobacco products are “customarily marketed 
. . . without . . . claims of therapeutic benefit.”68 To reach this conclusion, 
the Court pointed to the FDCA’s “core objective” of ensuring that drugs and 
devices are safe and effective for their intended use.69 Without disagreeing 
that nicotine-containing tobacco products were “intended to affect the struc-
ture or any function of the body,” the majority concluded that such products 
could not be regulated as drugs or devices because tobacco products could 
never meet the “safe and effective” standard.70 The FDA, in the majority’s 
view, would therefore be required to ban the sale of tobacco products if they 
came under the agency’s jurisdiction.71 
The majority’s opinion also rested heavily on tobacco’s “unique place 
in American history and society.”72 Referring to the economic, social, and 
political significance of the tobacco industry—which it described as “one of 
the greatest basic industries of the United States”—the majority concluded 
that “Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such eco-
nomic and political significance to [the FDA] in so cryptic a fashion.” As a 
result of the Supreme Court’s decision, the FDA was left without the au-
thority to regulate tobacco products “as customarily marketed” absent more 
explicit authorization from Congress, although it could still regulate other 
nicotine-containing products, such as NRTs, as drugs.  
                                                                                                                           
 65 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 172 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing). In 1994, Congress held hearings, known as the Waxman Hearings, to investigate the health 
harms created by tobacco. At those hearings, the seven CEOs of the major tobacco companies of 
the time denied that nicotine was addictive and maintained that their manipulation of nicotine 
levels in products was an effort to enhance flavor, not sustain addiction. Hilts, supra note 21, at 
A20. 
 66 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126–29 (majority opinion). 
 67 Id. at 129. 
 68 Id. at 127. 
 69 Id. at 142. 
 70 Id. at 132–33, 161. 
 71 Id. at 161. As the dissent noted, the FDA had interpreted the FDCA differently than the 
majority did, concluding that the law gave the FDA the flexibility to regulate tobacco products 
without banning them. Id. at 181 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The regulation it proposed would have 
limited the marketing and sales of tobacco products, but would not have banned them. Id. at 174. 
 72 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159 (majority opinion).  
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2. The Tobacco Control Act 
Nine years after the Brown & Williamson decision, Congress passed—
and President Obama signed—the TCA, granting the FDA broad jurisdic-
tion over tobacco products.73 Under the TCA, tobacco products are now a 
separate regulatory category distinct from drugs and devices.74 Instead of 
asking the FDA to assure that tobacco products are “safe and effective”—
which, as the majority in Brown & Williamson noted, may be inappropriate 
for an inherently deadly product—the TCA requires the FDA to regulate 
tobacco products based on a population-level public health standard.75 Un-
der this standard, the FDA must determine that its regulations are “appro-
priate for the protection of the public health” after considering “the risks 
and benefits to the population as a whole, including users and nonusers of 
the tobacco product.”76 
The TCA was a negotiated compromise between the tobacco industry 
and the public health community.77 The key compromise at its core is to-
bacco products that were already on the market would be “grandfathered,” 
but any new tobacco products must demonstrate either that they are “sub-
stantially equivalent” to grandfathered products or that allowing their sale 
would be “appropriate for the protection of public health.”78 This compro-
mise allowed the tobacco industry to keep selling tobacco products, while 
(at least in theory) ensuring that newly introduced products would benefit, 
and not harm, public health. 
In addition to the premarket review requirements, the TCA also gave 
the FDA broad authority over other areas of tobacco regulation including 
health claims, sales and marketing restrictions, and “product standards,” 
including mandated reductions in nicotine levels.79 Although a full review 
of the TCA’s provisions is beyond the scope of this Article, the law gives 
the FDA extremely powerful regulatory tools to reduce the death and dis-
ease caused by tobacco use.80  
                                                                                                                           
 73 See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 123 Stat. 1776, 1783–842 
(2009) (granting FDA more extensive jurisdiction over tobacco products). 
 74 Id. at 1842–49. 
 75 See id. at 1796. 
 76 Id. § 906(d)(1), 123 Stat. at 1796. 
 77 Desmond Jenson et al., FDA’s Misplaced Priorities: Premarket Review Under the Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 25 TOBACCO CONTROL 246, 246 (2016). 
 78 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 910, 123 Stat. at 1807; see also 
Jenson et al., supra note 77, at 246. 
 79 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 123 Stat. at 1842–49. These re-
strictions can be applied to grandfathered products. 
 80 For a detailed description of the TCA’s provisions, see generally Corinne G. Husten & 
Lawrence R. Deyton, Understanding the Tobacco Control Act: Efforts by the US Food and Drug 
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C. The Rise of E-cigarettes 
The requirements of the TCA applied immediately to certain enumer-
ated tobacco products: cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and roll-your-own 
tobacco.81 The law, however, did not immediately extend the FDA’s authori-
ty to other types of tobacco products, including e-cigarettes, hookah tobac-
co, cigars, cigarillos, and pipe tobacco.82 Instead, the TCA provided that the 
FDA could make these products, and any other product meeting the statuto-
ry definition of a “tobacco product,” subject to the law’s requirements by 
promulgating a regulation.83 
Consistent with the process outlined in the TCA, in May 2016, the FDA 
finalized a rule doing just that—the Deeming Rule. The rule deems any prod-
uct meeting the statutory definition of a “tobacco product,”84 including e-
cigarettes, to be subject to the agency’s tobacco regulatory scheme, including 
the pre-market review requirements outlined above.85 Tobacco products 
brought within the scope of the FDA’s authority by the Deeming Rule will 
also now include warning labels and comply with various other restrictions, 
including a prohibition on false or misleading claims.86 
The rapid emergence of e-cigarettes was one of the forces driving the 
FDA to issue the Deeming Rule. Unlike combustible cigarettes, e-cigarettes 
deliver nicotine by heating (not burning) a nicotine-containing liquid until it 
                                                                                                                           
Administration to Make Tobacco-Related Morbidity and Mortality Part of the USA’s Past, Not Its 
Future, 381 LANCET 1570 (2013). 
 81 21 U.S.C. § 387a(b) (2012). 
 82 See id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Deeming Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,974, 29,102 (May 10, 2016). The Deeming Rule also in-
cludes components and parts, which means “any software or assembly of materials intended or 
reasonably expected: (1) [t]o alter or affect the tobacco product’s performance, composition, con-
stituents or characteristics; or (2) to be used with or for the human consumption of a tobacco 
product.” Id. at 29,015. 
 85 Id. at 28,977. This premarket review process will undoubtedly be much harder for e-
cigarette companies because of the amount of data and capital it takes to put forth a new product 
application. The FDA, however, delayed the deadline for these new product applications. FDA 
Comprehensive Plan, supra note 1. Notably, several public health groups have challenged the 
agency’s delay in regulation. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. FDA, No. 8:18-cv-883 (D. Md. 
filed Mar. 27, 2018). 
 86 Deeming Rule, Fed. Red. at 28,975–76. Newly deemed tobacco products may not yet be 
following some of these requirements. This is because the FDA has specified different dates at 
which it will enforce compliance with the various requirements of the Deeming Rule, many of 
which post-date the writing of this Article. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTP-68-RB, EFFEC-
TIVE AND COMPLIANCE DATES APPLICABLE TO RETAILERS, MANUFACTURERS, IMPORTERS, AND 
DISTRIBUTORS OF NEWLY DEEMED TOBACCO PRODUCTS 1–7 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/
downloads/TobaccoProducts/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/UCM501016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2E6L-2FWL]. 
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aerosolizes, which the user then inhales, referred to as vaping.87 The liquid, 
referred to as an “e-liquid,” usually contains nicotine derived from tobacco, 
a humectant (propylene glycol and/or vegetable glycerin), and flavorings.88 
First introduced in the United States in 2007, e-cigarette use has risen expo-
nentially. By 2014, almost half (forty-nine percent) of daily smokers report-
ed ever having used e-cigarettes,89 and e-cigarette use is now more common 
than cigarette use among high school and middle school students.90 
As a matter of public health, e-cigarettes hold both promise and peril.91 
Although the long-term health effects of e-cigarettes are unknown, they are 
likely far less lethal that cigarettes and other combustible products.92 If cur-
rent smokers switched completely from smoking to e-cigarette use that 
would likely produce enormous public health gains. Currently, however, the 
                                                                                                                           
 87 Early e-cigarettes were called “cigalikes” and mimicked the size, shape, and design of ciga-
rettes. These products have evolved over time and now many do not resemble cigarettes at all; 
some of the most popular systems include detachable parts that allow the user to customize the 
vaping experience, including the voltage, the temperature, the size of the tank, etc., and allow for 
the mixing and switching of new flavors easily. At least some of the newer products appear to be 
more efficient at delivering nicotine. Vaporizers, E-Cigarettes, and Other Electronic Nicotine 
Delivery Systems (ENDS), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/tobacco
products/labeling/productsingredientscomponents/ucm456610.htm [https://perma.cc/ZPH7-SGZW]. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Cristine D. Delnevo et al., Patterns of Electronic Cigarette Use Among Adults in the United 
States, 18 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 715, 716 (2016). 
 90 Ahmed Jamal et al., Tobacco Use Among Middle and High School Students—United States, 
2011–2016, 66 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 597, 597 (2017). 
 91 See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, MED., PUBLIC HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF E-
CIGARETTES 15-16 (2018) (conducting a comprehensive review of the scientific literature on e-
cigarettes and concluding that e-cigarettes “contain fewer toxicants” than conventional cigarettes 
and “might be useful as a cessation aid in smokers who use e-cigarettes exclusively,” but that the 
long-term health effects of e-cigarettes are unknown and that “youth who begin with e-cigarettes 
are more likely to transition to combustible tobacco cigarette use”). Although not addressed in this 
Article, the National Academies committee report noted that secondhand exposure to e-cigarette 
aerosols may also raise health concerns. Id. at 77–84. The committee found “conclusive evidence 
that e-cigarette use increases airborne concentrations of particulate matter and nicotine in indoor 
environments compared with background levels,” but it cautioned that due to the limited amount 
of research on this subject, “it is unclear how detrimental exposure to second-hand e-cigarette 
emissions is to the non-user.” Id. at 4, 17, 84, 410. 
 92 Although the harms of e-cigarettes are likely less than combustible products, there is still 
potential for significant harms from the products, the nicotine, the flavorings, or the components 
or parts used to vaporize the liquid. For example, at least one experiment has found that use of e-
cigarettes can lead to the stiffening of blood vessels, similar to what smoking combustible ciga-
rettes does, in ways that may raise the likelihood of cardiovascular events. See Charalambos Vla-
chopoulos et al., Electronic Cigarette Smoking Increases Aortic Stiffness and Blood Pressure in 
Young Smokers, 67 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 2082, 2082 (2016); Roberto Carnevale et al., Acute 
Impact of Tobacco vs Electronic Cigarette Smoking on Oxidative Stress and Vascular Function, 
150 CHEST 606, 606 (2016). 
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majority of people who use e-cigarettes are also smoking.93 Youth e-
cigarette use is additionally a concern, both because of the effects of nico-
tine on the developing brain,94 and because of accumulating evidence that e-
cigarette use is a gateway to smoking.95 Moreover, the history of tobacco 
product marketing suggests that the industry has economic incentives to 
target the youth population in its marketing, and is likely to do so.96 
Although not explicitly stated, the FDA’s new “comprehensive plan” is 
built on the assumption that if the nicotine in cigarettes is reduced to non-
addictive or minimally addictive levels, many current smokers will transition 
to e-cigarettes as the best available substitute. For this reason, the FDA’s plan 
seeks to encourage “innovations” in the e-cigarette market and delays the ef-
fective date for some of the Deeming Rule’s more costly requirements.97 At 
the same time, the FDA recognizes that e-cigarettes cannot be completely 
unregulated. The Deeming Rule already prohibits unsubstantiated health 
claims, bars sales to minors, and requires e-cigarette companies to disclose 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Charlotte A. Schoenborn, QuickStats: Cigarette Smoking Status Among Current Adult E-
cigarette Users, by Age Group—National Health Interview Survey, United States, 2015, 65 MOR-
BIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1177, 1177 (2016). 
 94 See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text. 
 95 See Jessica Barrington-Trimis et al., E-cigarettes and Future Cigarette Use, 138 PEDIAT-
RICS 1, 1 (2016); Adam M. Leventhal et al., Association of Electronic Cigarette Use with Initiation 
of Combustible Tobacco Product Smoking in Early Adolescence, 314 JAMA 700, 700 (2015); 
Brian A. Primack et al., Progression to Traditional Cigarette Smoking After Electronic Cigarette 
Use Among US Adolescents and Young Adults, 169 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1018, 1022 (2015) (sug-
gesting that “[b]ecause e-cigarettes deliver nicotine more slowly than traditional cigarettes, they 
may serve as a ‘nicotine starter,’ allowing a new user to advance to cigarette smoking as he or she 
becomes tolerant of the initial adverse effects”). These findings include suggestive evidence that 
some youth who would not otherwise be likely to become smokers progress to smoking after e-
cigarette use. Barrington-Trimis et al., supra, at 1; Leventhal et al., supra, at 700; Primack et al., 
supra, at 1022. Also, one should note that the history of tobacco marketing suggests that e-
cigarette companies, despite statements to the contrary, have strong economic incentives to sell to 
youth. Ross Hammond, WHO, Tobacco Advertising & Promotion: The Need for a Coordinated 
Global Response, 9 (2000). 
 96 See generally CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS: TOBACCO COMPANY MARKETING TO 
KIDS (Apr. 2018), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/factsheets/0008.pdf [https://perma.cc/
XA87-KV28] (providing a compilation of Tobacco Industry statements, actions, and quotations 
regarding targeted marketing of children). 
 97 FDA Comprehensive Plan, supra note 1. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, 
there is room to question whether the FDA’s approach is well designed to encourage innovation. 
The extended dates for premarket review apply only to products that were on the market as of 
August 8, 2016. Id. After that date, any new product cannot be sold until it undergoes premarket 
review by the FDA. Thus, the extended dates provide a reprieve to e-cigarette companies that 
were worried they would be unable to comply with the FDA’s requirements—but does nothing to 
encourage companies to create new, innovative products that meet the FDA’s requirements or 
improve on existing products. See id.  
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their ingredient lists to the FDA; the FDA has pledged to go further and de-
velop product standards relating to battery safety and child-proofing.98 
Regardless of where one stands on the harm reduction debate sur-
rounding e-cigarettes, all sides should be able to agree that there is a role for 
reasonable regulation (although there may be disagreement over the extent 
of regulation that is reasonable). A complete lack of regulation invites prob-
lems that have already been observed in the, until recently, unregulated e-
cigarette market: “false and misleading claims,”99 inaccurate labeling,100 
dangerously shoddy product quality,101 unabashed marketing to youth,102 
and more. Nevertheless, even with full implementation of the Deeming 
Rule, it appears as though one portion of the e-cigarette market may remain 
completely unregulated, at least for now: synthetic nicotine products. 
D. The Emergence of Synthetic Nicotine 
The Deeming Rule generally applies to e-cigarettes that contain nico-
tine “made or derived from tobacco . . . .”103 In the last few years, however, 
over a dozen e-cigarette brands have begun to sell products containing syn-
                                                                                                                           
 98 Id. The FDA also states that it intends to propose a rule for the regulation of flavors in 
newly deemed products. Id. 
 99 See Elizabeth Klein et al., Online E-cigarette Marketing Claims: A Systematic Content and 
Legal Analysis, 2 TOBACCO REGULATORY SCI. 252, 262 (2016). 
 100 See Kelly Buettner-Schmidt et al., Electronic Cigarette Refill Liquids: Child-Resistant 
Packaging, Nicotine Content, and Sales to Minors, 31 J. PEDIATRIC NURSING 373, 373 (2016). 
 101 See Jamie Harshman et al., Burns Associated with E-cigarette Batteries: A Case Series and 




 102 See generally Jennifer C. Duke et al., Exposure to Electronic Cigarette Television Adver-
tisements Among Youth and Young Adults, 134 PEDIATRICS 1 (2014). 
 103 Deeming Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,974, 28,976 (May 10, 2016). As of the time of writing, the 
FDA has identified three circumstances where non-nicotine e-liquids or e-cigarettes are still sub-
ject to FDA authority, noting that: 
e-liquids marketed as “nicotine-free” may properly be considered tobacco prod-
ucts—or components or parts thereof—under certain circumstances. As the record 
demonstrates, some e-liquids claiming to be nicotine-free actually contain[] high 
levels of nicotine . . . . Others are tobacco flavored, and are thus made or derived 
from tobacco regardless of their nicotine content . . . . And nicotine-free e-liquids 
are sometimes mixed with liquid nicotine before inhalation, . . . affecting not only 
the composition of the substance ultimately vaporized, but also its constituents and 
characteristics . . . . 
Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 37, Nicopure Labs, LLC v. FDA, 266 
F. Supp. 3d 360 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 16-878) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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thetic nicotine, developed in a lab without the use of tobacco plants.104 This 
product is chemically identical to the nicotine found in tobacco plants—and 
similarly addictive—but likely falls outside of the FDA’s tobacco-related 
authority. 
Sellers of synthetic nicotine products claim they are an important in-
novation in nicotine products, because tobacco-derived nicotine inevitably 
contains some contaminants—including potentially carcinogenic ones—
from tobacco plants, whereas synthetic nicotine is pure.105 For the same rea-
son, sellers contend that synthetic nicotine products offer a “comparatively 
clean flavor” when used in e-liquids.106 
Although the technology to create synthetic nicotine has existed since 
the 1940s, the high cost of production has limited its commercial use in 
products intended for human consumption.107 Now, however, more efficient 
production methods seem to have been developed, and some companies are 
selling synthetic nicotine products (or, at least, products that sellers claim 
contain synthetic nicotine) at prices comparable to other e-liquids.108 For 
example, we observed that one company sells 60 mL of its “mangolito” fla-
vor e-juice with tobacco-derived nicotine for $24.99, and it sells the same 
amount of the same flavor e-juice with synthetic nicotine for $27.99.109 
Moreover, although the market for products containing synthetic nicotine 
currently appears to be dominated by e-liquids, synthetic nicotine could be 
used as an ingredient in any product in which a seller wants to include nico-
tine. For example, one seller has announced plans to launch a gum that con-
tains synthetic nicotine, and before the TCA was enacted, companies (un-
successfully) attempted to market water that contained tobacco-derived nic-
otine as a dietary supplement.110 
                                                                                                                           
 104 Sarah Zhang, E-Cigs Are Going Tobacco-Free with Synthetic Nicotine, WIRED (June 27, 
2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/vaping-industry-wants-go-post-tobacco-synthetic-
nicotine/ [https://perma.cc/V22S-ZY82]. 
 105 See, e.g., Zia Gum, NEXTGENERATION LABS (2018), http://www.nextgenerationlabs.com/
zia-gum/ [https://perma.cc/4NHB-BWC8]. 
 106 See Zhang, supra note 104. 
 107 2016 SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 48, at 17. 
 108 Although at least one seller has been awarded a patent on its process for producing syn-
thetic nicotine, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no third parties have confirmed that the 
nicotine that sellers market as synthetic is, in fact, synthesized in a lab and not derived from to-
bacco. For the purposes of this Article, however, we assume that products marketed as containing 
synthetic nicotine do contain it. See e.g., U.S. Patent No. 9,556,142 (filed Oct. 22, 2015). 
 109 Mangolito Premium E-Liquid, EJUICE, https://www.ejuices.com/products/mangolito?
variant=25544343112 [https://perma.cc/UGQ6-DZF7]; see also Mangolito TFN Premium E-
Liquid, EJUICE, https://www.ejuices.com/products/mangolito-tfn?variant=27307416072 [https://
perma.cc/TVP5-DSAV]. 
 110 See, e.g., Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 2002, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (updated 
May 2, 2016), https://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/20170723183304/https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/
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One company asked the FDA for clarification on whether synthetic 
nicotine products would fall within the Deeming Rule’s scope.111 Although 
the FDA explained that synthetic nicotine products must be evaluated on a 
“case-by-case basis,” it also acknowledged that “it’s possible [such prod-
ucts] would not be regulated by the FDA as . . . tobacco product[s].”112 In-
deed, we think it likely that e-cigarettes and other products that use only 
synthetic nicotine—which, by definition, is not “made or derived from to-
bacco”—are not tobacco products under the TCA.113 Thus, these products 
are not subject to any of the Deeming Rule’s regulations–no premarket ap-
proval requirements, no warning labels, no prohibition on health-related 
claims, and so forth. This regulatory gap is problematic.114 As discussed in 
the following Part, however, the FDA has a viable option for closing it: 
classifying synthetic nicotine products as drugs.115 
II. THE LEGAL CASE FOR REGULATING SYNTHETIC NICOTINE  
PRODUCTS AS DRUGS 
Some in the e-cigarette industry have claimed synthetic nicotine prod-
ucts’ escape from the requirements of the Deeming Rule and the FDA’s to-
bacco regulatory scheme as a “victory,” seemingly concluding that if syn-
thetic nicotine products are not tobacco products, they are not subject to any 
FDA regulation.116 The question of whether synthetic nicotine products are 
tobacco products, however, is not the end of the inquiry into the FDA’s ju-
risdiction. This Part argues that examining the relevant statutory provisions, 
case law, and regulations, as well as other agency interpretations of the law, 
                                                                                                                           
EnforcementActions/EnforcementStory/EnforcementStoryArchive/ucm103554.htm [https://perma.
cc/6HSW-AUBJ]; Zia Gum, supra note 105. Nicotine-containing products cannot be dietary sup-
plements under the FDCA. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 111 Commonly Asked Questions, supra note 14. 
 112 Id. 
 113 21 U.S.C. § 321(rr)(1) (2012). 
 114 Though not addressed in this Article, one important concern is that if the FDA proceeds 
with mandating reductions in nicotine levels in cigarettes and synthetic nicotine products remain 
unregulated, a market could develop for synthetic nicotine liquid that consumers could add into 
their low-nicotine cigarettes. This could undermine the effectiveness of an FDA policy intended to 
render cigarettes non-addictive. See Dorothy K. Hatsukami et al., Nicotine Reduction: Strategic 
Research Plan, 15 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 1003, 1010 (2013) (noting that consumers’ post-
market addition of nicotine back into the product could be an “unintended consequence” of a nico-
tine reduction regulation). 
 115 See infra notes 116–209 and accompanying text. 
 116 Tony Ottomanelli II, Update: Nicopure v. FDA Lawsuit, VAPING POST (Dec. 20, 2016), 
http://www.vapingpost.com/2016/12/20/update-nicopure-v-fda-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/2K6A-
9WRR].  
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reveals that synthetic nicotine products should be considered to be drugs 
under the FDCA.117 
A. The Flexibility to Regulate Synthetic Nicotine Products as Drugs 
The FDCA defines a “drug” as an “article” “intended for use in the di-
agnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease” or “intended 
to affect the structure or any function of the body . . . .”118 Although courts 
(and the FDA) have generally construed this definition quite broadly, the 
definition does not cover “customarily marketed” tobacco products.119 As 
previously discussed in Part I,120 in FDA v. Brown & Williamson, a majority 
of the Supreme Court concluded that—before the enactment of the TCA—
Congress had “clearly precluded the FDA from asserting jurisdiction to reg-
ulate tobacco products as drugs or devices when those tobacco products 
were customarily marketed . . . without . . . claims of therapeutic benefit.”121 
Courts have continued to take this position after the TCA’s enactment. 
In 2010, in Sottera v. FDA, an e-cigarette company sued the FDA after the 
agency sought to regulate the company’s products as drug-device combina-
tions.122 Relying on Brown & Williamson, the D.C. Circuit concluded that, 
because the e-cigarettes at issue had tobacco-derived nicotine and therefore 
met the TCA’s definition of a “tobacco product,” the FDA must regulate 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1). Depending on how a synthetic nicotine product is marketed—
for example, either as a liquid alone or as a liquid combined with a mechanism for delivery—it 
might be categorized as either a drug or a drug-device combination product. This Article, howev-
er, generally describes synthetic nicotine products as drugs. Even if a given synthetic nicotine 
product is a drug-device combination product, the FDA would likely regulate the product as a 
drug. This is because, for combination products, the FDA must determine the product’s “primary 
mode of action”—that is, the component that “provides the most important therapeutic action”—
and oversee the product accordingly. Id. § 353(g); 21 C.F.R. § 3.2 (2017). For synthetic nicotine 
products, it is the nicotine liquid that creates an effect in the body, and any device component is 
intended solely to deliver the nicotine. Therefore, as with drug-device combination products like 
prefilled syringes, the FDA is likely to regulate combination synthetic nicotine products as drugs. 
Additionally, the relevant language in the definitions of “drug” and “device” in the FDCA are 
nearly identical. Both focus on whether an “article” is “intended for use” in diagnosing, curing, 
mitigating, treating, or preventing disease, or is “intended to affect the structure or any function of 
the body . . . .” 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1), (h). Thus, FDA jurisdiction over synthetic nicotine prod-
ucts, and many relevant requirements that come with such jurisdiction, do not turn on whether a 
given product would be regulated as a drug or drug-device combination. 
 118 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1). 
 119 See Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891, 894 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco, Inc., 529 U.S. 120, 126, 159 (2000)). 
 120 See supra notes 21–114 and accompanying texts. 
 121 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126. 
 122 Sottera, 627 F.3d at 893. 
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them as tobacco products, so long as they are “customarily marketed.”123 
That is, according to Sottera, the FDA lacked the discretion to regulate the 
e-cigarettes pursuant to its drug and device authorities, provided that the 
seller was not making “therapeutic claims.”124 
Consistent with Sottera, in a 2017 final rule on the meaning of “in-
tended use,” the FDA clarified that it will regulate products made or derived 
from tobacco as drugs or devices only when they are intended for disease 
treatment or prevention (e.g., if they are marketed with smoking cessation 
claims) or if they are marketed with claims, not commonly and legally 
made at the time Brown & Williamson was decided, that the product affects 
the structure or function of the body.125  
But, crucially, these limits on the agency’s flexibility to regulate tobac-
co products as drugs, devices, or drug-device combination products do not 
apply to synthetic nicotine products. Synthetic products are not made or 
derived from tobacco, so they are generally considered not to be tobacco 
products.126 Additionally, many of the concerns about the application of the 
                                                                                                                           
 123 Id. at 893–94. The reasoning of Sottera was questionable. As discussed, the Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco decision focused on the unique history of tobacco and tobacco regulation. E-
cigarettes are relatively new products without the unique history and economic importance of 
traditional tobacco. The Supreme Court certainly did not have e-cigarettes (which had not been 
introduced in the United States yet) in mind when it wrote its decision. See generally Brown & 
Williamson, 529 U.S. 120 (lacking any mention of e-cigarettes). Thus, the FDA could have rea-
sonably concluded that Brown & Williamson did not constrain its discretion with regards to other 
nicotine-containing products. See generally id. Likewise, no evidence exists showing that Con-
gress, when it passed the TCA, was thinking about e-cigarettes at all—and none that it intended 
for them to be regulated only as tobacco products. 
 124 Sottera, 627 F.3d at 893–94. 
 125 January 2017 FDA Clarification, supra note 55, at 2194, 2198, 2214. As discussed above, 
the FDA indefinitely delayed the effective date of other, contested aspects of this final rule. 2018 
FDA Clarification, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,639, 11,639 (Mar. 16, 2018); see supra note 55 and accompa-
nying text. 
 126 See Commonly Asked Questions, supra note 14; Sarah Zhang, supra note 104; cf. What Is 
TFN, NEXT GENERATION LABS, http://www.nextgenerationlabs.com/ [https://perma.cc/5JGA-
J5SM] (marketing a product called TFN®, or “Tobacco Free Nicotine”). Because dietary supple-
ments can be intended to affect structure or function of the body without becoming drugs under 
the law, it is also worth noting that synthetic nicotine products do not meet the definition of a 
dietary supplement. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff) (2012). Most importantly, the FDA has previously 
opined that products containing nicotine cannot be dietary supplements because dietary supple-
ments cannot contain active ingredients that were approved or studied as drugs before being mar-
keted as dietary supplements or foods. See id. § 321(ff)(3). Nicotine has been an active ingredient 
in approved NRT drugs since the early 1980s, well before both the enactment of the Dietary Sup-
plement Health and Education Act of 1994, which created the modern scheme for regulating die-
tary supplements and any companies’ attempts to market nicotine-containing products as dietary 
supplements. See Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 2002, supra note 110. Even if nico-
tine was not an active ingredient in drugs, dietary substances must contain a “dietary ingredient,” 
and, in certain circumstances, the FDA takes the position that synthesized versions of naturally 
occurring dietary substances do not qualify as such. 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff)(1); see also U.S. FOOD & 
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FDA’s drug authorities to tobacco products, which drove the majority’s de-
cision in Brown & Williamson, are not present for synthetic nicotine prod-
ucts.127 If synthetic nicotine e-cigarettes live up to advocates’ claims that 
they are a safe(r) way to use nicotine, these products should not provoke the 
same concern that they cannot satisfy the “safe and effective” standard 
needed for drug approval as cigarettes did.128 Similarly, the synthetic nico-
tine industry is a nascent one, without the economic, social, and political 
significance of the tobacco industry that helped motivate the majority’s 
conclusion in Brown & Williamson that Congress did not intend for the 
FDA to regulate tobacco products.129 Finally, Congress explicitly chose to 
apply the TCA’s requirements only to “tobacco products,” declining to di-
rect the FDA to regulate drugs containing nicotine, such as the smoking 
cessation products long regulated as drugs, under the new TCA scheme.130 
Therefore, unlike the FDA’s attempt to regulate traditional tobacco products 
as drug-device combination products in the 1990’s, the FDA regulating syn-
thetic nicotine products as drugs would not raise concerns that the FDA was 
contravening the will of Congress.131 
This means that, as with any other novel product, the FDA has consider-
able flexibility to determine whether a synthetic nicotine product falls within 
the drug definition.132 That is, the inquiry for determining whether a particu-
                                                                                                                           
DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: NEW DIETARY IN-
GREDIENT NOTIFICATIONS AND RELATED ISSUES 38 (2016), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/UCM515733.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YY8J-LH69]. Thus, although nicotine naturally occurs in certain foods, such as toma-
toes, synthetic nicotine may not be a dietary ingredient. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff)(1). Moreover, to 
be a dietary supplement, a product must be “intended for ingestion.” Id. § 321(ff)(2)(A)(i). Cur-
rently marketed synthetic nicotine e-liquids are intended for inhalation, not ingestion. 
 127 See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133–61. 
 128 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(d), 393(b)(2)(B). 
 129 See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 172. 
 130 See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act §§ 911(c), (g)(4), 918, Pub. L. 
No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009). 
 131 On the other hand, one might argue that the FDA choosing not to regulate synthetic nico-
tine products would contravene the will of Congress. Part of the rationale for Congress enacting 
the TCA was its recognition of the addictive nature of nicotine and the risks nicotine poses for 
youth, both concerns that apply to synthetic nicotine as forcefully as to tobacco-derived nicotine. 
Thus, the TCA might be viewed as evincing Congress’s general intent that the FDA oversee all 
nicotine-containing products, even if Congress did not anticipate the development of a market of 
synthetic nicotine consumer products at the time the law was enacted. See generally id. 
 132 See United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 793 (1969) (giving the FDA wide latitude 
in how it interprets the drug and device definitions in the FDCA); Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of 
Regulation Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 28 FOOD DRUG & COSMETIC L.J. 177, 
178 (1973) (arguing that “the Act must be regarded as a constitution” that “establishes a set of fun-
damental objectives—safe, effective, wholesome, and truthfully-labeled products—without attempt-
ing to specify every detail of regulation”). 
1956 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1933 
lar synthetic nicotine product is a drug is the same as it is for any non-tobacco 
product. There is no need to consider whether the synthetic nicotine product 
is “customarily marketed,” nor are there any tobacco-specific limits on the 
agency’s authority to regulate synthetic nicotine products as drugs. 
B. The Intended Use of Synthetic Nicotine 
Because Brown & Williamson and Sottera do not apply to products 
that are not “tobacco products,” the determining factor for whether synthet-
ic nicotine products are drugs is, simply, their intended use.133 Although the 
precise rule for determining a drug’s intended use is currently the subject of 
debate,134 a myriad of evidence may be relevant to the analysis.135 Most 
clearly, a seller’s representations about its product might be evidence of the 
product’s intended use.136 But the plain language of the statute, which de-
scribes uses as “intended” rather than “labeled,” “promoted,” or “claimed,” 
makes apparent that evidence other than a sellers’ representations can also 
be relevant.137 
                                                                                                                           
 133 See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 172; Sottera, 627 F.3d at 894. 
 134 See 2018 FDA Clarification, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,639, 11,639–41 (Mar. 16, 2018); Medical 
Information Working Group et al., Petition to Stay and for Reconsideration of Clarification of 
When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated as Drugs, Devices, or Combination 
Products, 2–9 (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-N-2002-1977 
[https://perma.cc/4LXR-WF5C]; see also Lewis A. Grossman, Food, Drugs, and Droods: A His-
torical Consideration of Definitions and Categories in American Food and Drug Law, 93 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1091, 1108 (2008) (“Indeed, modern food and drug law is bedeviled by the question 
of how the phrase ‘intended to’ in these definitions should be construed.”). 
 135 See, e.g., United States v. Storage Spaces Designated Nos. “8” & “49,” 777 F.2d 1363, 
1366 (9th Cir. 1985) (“This intent may be derived or inferred from labeling, promotional material, 
advertising, or any other relevant source.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 136 Grossman, supra note 134, at 1108. 
 137 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2012); see also Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 170 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (“The FDCA . . . does not use the word ‘claimed’; it uses the word ‘intended.’”); 
Storage Spaces, 777 F.2d at 1366 (“This intent may be derived or inferred from labeling, promo-
tional material, advertising, or any other relevant source.”); Action on Smoking & Health v. Har-
ris, 655 F.2d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[I]t is well established ‘that the ‘intended use’ of a prod-
uct, within the meaning of the Act, is determined from its label, accompanying labeling, promo-
tional claims, advertising, and any other relevant source.”); Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. FDA, 
504 F.2d 761, 789 (2d Cir. 1974) (“[A] factfinder should be free to pierce all of a manufacturer’s 
subjective claims of intent . . . to find actual therapeutic intent on the basis of objective evidence . . 
. .”); United States v. Article . . . Consisting of 216 Cartoned Bottles, More or Less, Sudden 
Change, 409 F.2d 734, 739 (2d Cir. 1969) (“It is well settled that the intended use of a product 
may be determined from its label, accompanying labeling, promotional material, advertising and 
any other relevant source.”); V.E. Irons, Inc. v. United States, 244 F.2d 34, 44 (1st Cir. 1957) 
(“[W]e are free to look to all relevant sources in order to ascertain what is the ‘intended use’ of a 
drug, and are not merely confined to the labels on the drug or the ‘labeling.’ The legislative histo-
ry of the 1938 Act makes this clear. Such also has been the undeviating opinion of the courts 
which have had occasion to deal with the issue.”); United States v. Travia, 180 F. Supp. 2d 115, 
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The available evidence for synthetic nicotine products suggests that 
there is a strong case for the FDA to conclude that these products fall within 
the FDCA’s broad definition of a drug.138 Companies’ representations about 
their products, the design of the products, and the circumstances surround-
ing their distribution all support this conclusion, as described in detail be-
low.139 Moreover, when sellers have challenged the FDA’s authority to regu-
late a product—or challenged the FDA’s determination about which catego-
ry a product falls within—courts have generally sided with the FDA.140 
Thus, even if one (or two) of the below-discussed sources of evidence about 
the intended uses of synthetic nicotine products were unpersuasive to 
                                                                                                                           
119 (D.D.C. 2001) (“Labeling is not exclusive evidence of the sellers’ intent. Rather . . . ‘it is well 
established that the intended use of a product, within the meaning of the [FDCA], is determined 
from its label, accompanying labeling, promotional claims, advertising, and any other relevant 
source.’”) (quoting Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); 
United States v. 250 Jars, etc., of U.S. Fancy Pure Honey, 218 F. Supp. 208, 211 (E.D. Mich. 
1963) (“In determining that a particular article was intended to be used as a drug, a court is not 
limited to the labels on such article or to the labeling which accompanies it, but may look at all 
relevant sources.”), aff’d sub nom., United States v. 250 Jars “Cal’s Tupelo Blossom U.S. Fancy 
Pure Honey,” 344 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Undetermined Quantities of an Arti-
cle of Drug Labeled as “Exachol,” 716 F. Supp. 787, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“The FDA is not 
bound by the vendor’s subjective claims of intent, but can find actual therapeutic intent on the 
basis of objective evidence. . . . This intent may be derived from the labelling [sic], promotional 
material, advertising or any other relevant source.”); United States v. 789 Cases of Latex Sur-
geons’ Gloves, 799 F. Supp. 1275, 1285 (D.P.R. 1992) (“All of the circumstances surrounding the 
promotion and sale of the product constitute the ‘intent.’ It is not enough for the manufacturer to 
merely say that he or she did not ‘intend’ to sell a particular product as a device.”); United States 
v. Vascular Sols., Inc., 181 F. Supp. 3d 342, 347 (W.D. Tex. 2016) (noting that non-public state-
ments may be used as evidence of intended use); Grossman, supra note 134, at 1109 (“In the years 
immediately following [the enactment of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act] . . . the FDA and the 
courts looked to evidence other than drug manufacturers’ explicit claims to determine the ‘intend-
ed use’ of products.”); cf. United States v. An Article of Device, 731 F.2d 1253, 1258 (7th Cir. 
1984) (“[E]vidence showing that the TRD was used solely for research does not rebut the evi-
dence that the device was intended for use in the treatment and diagnosis of disease.”). 
 138 See infra notes 143–210 and accompanying text. 
 139 See infra notes 143–210 and accompanying text. 
 140 See Adam Candeub, Digital Medicine, the FDA, and the First Amendment, 49 GA. L. REV. 
933, 957 (2015); Patricia J. Zettler, What Lies Ahead for FDA Regulation of tDCS Products, 3 J.L. 
& BIOSCI. 318, 321 (2016). But see Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Shalala, 963 F. Supp. 20, 28 
(D.D.C. 1997) (rejecting the FDA’s product classification because the agency’s decision did not 
treat like products similarly). Additionally, categorizing synthetic nicotine products as drugs 
would be consistent with past FDA positions on products that similarly contain ingredients that are 
also commonly in non-drug products. For example, caffeine is in many foods such as coffee, but 
in certain circumstances the FDA has asserted that powdered caffeine products are drugs. See, e.g., 
Warning Letter from Michael Dutcher, Dir., FDA Minneapolis Dist., to Timothy Meyer, alvSupple-
ment Direct (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.fda.gov/iceci/enforcementactions/warningletters/2016/
ucm489374.htm [https://perma.cc/K5WK-55NR] (describing caffeine powder as a drug). 
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courts, courts may be likely to agree with, or defer to, the agency’s interpre-
tation that a synthetic nicotine product is a drug.141 
To be clear, determining a product’s intended use is a product-specific 
inquiry. The features of the particular product at issue, including the seller’s 
representations about the product, must be assessed individually.142 But in 
this Article, we do not take on the task of fully examining individual prod-
ucts or identifying specific products that meet the definition of a drug. Ra-
ther, we demonstrate that, based on the illustrative examples identified be-
low, it appears that synthetic nicotine products generally fall within the drug 
definition. 
1. Sellers’ Representations 
Sellers’ claims that their products diagnose, cure, mitigate, treat, or pre-
vent disease (“disease claims”) or that their products affect the structure or 
function of the body (“structure/function claims”) are, perhaps, the evidence 
that the FDA most commonly, and least controversially, relies on to determine 
a product’s intended use.143 These claims might come in the form of written 
statements or graphic representations in product labeling or advertising, in-
cluding on websites or social media, or oral statements made by or on behalf 
of the seller.144 Additionally, both disease and structure/function claims might 
be explicit or implicit. For example, “controls diabetes” is an explicit claim 
that a product treats diabetes, whereas “controls blood sugar” implies that a 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See Zettler, supra note 140, at 321. The majority’s conclusion in Sottera that the FDA was 
not owed deference because the question at issue in that case was not one of statutory interpreta-
tion, but rather one of interpreting Brown & Williamson, is not relevant to synthetic nicotine prod-
ucts because they are not tobacco products. See Sottera, 627 F.3d at 893–94. 
 142 See, e.g., Zettler, supra note 140, at 321. 
 143 Cf. Medical Information Working Group et al., supra note 134, at 2 (“From the outset, the 
‘intended use’ prong of the drug definition related to the seller’s claims for its products.”). In re-
cent years, courts have become increasingly willing to find that the FDA’s policies on “off-label” 
promotion of approved drug products, which rely on sellers’ claims as evidence of intent, conflict 
with First Amendment protections for commercial speech. Christopher Robertson & Aaron S. 
Kesselheim, Regulating Off-Label Promotion—A Critical Test, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2313, 
2313–14 (2016). Scholars have expressed concern that if the logic of these decisions is extended, 
the entire structure of the FDCA—including, possibly, the reliance on sellers’ claims as evidence 
of intended use for the purposes of defining a product—may be eroded. Id. at 2315. Courts, how-
ever, have thus far not concluded that the First Amendment protects the promotion of unapproved 
drugs or bars the FDA from considering sellers’ representations in determining whether the FDA 
has jurisdiction over a product. For a general discussion of the First Amendment in the commer-
cial speech context, see Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. 
L. REV. 1153 (2012). 
 144 Cf. Nathan Cortez, The Statutory Case Against Off-Label Promotion, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 
ONLINE 124, 126 (2016), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev_online/vol83/iss1/12/ [https://
perma.cc/K5WK-55NR] (explaining the varied forms that prescription drug promotion takes). 
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product treats diabetes through referencing a characteristic sign of the dis-
ease.145 Likewise, a structure/function claim might be implicit—as one ex-
ample, “charge your mind” does not explicitly state that a product will en-
hance cognitive function, but implies that it will.146 
Reviewing the websites and social media accounts of synthetic nico-
tine product sellers suggests that sellers routinely make representations that 
the FDA could reasonably construe as either disease or structure/function 
claims. Smoking cessation claims are the most obvious kind of disease 
claims that purveyors of synthetic nicotine products might make.147 This is 
because many consumers believe that e-cigarettes—whether using synthetic 
nicotine or nicotine derived from tobacco—are effective smoking cessation 
aids.148 
Consistent with this market potential, some sellers of synthetic nico-
tine products appear to represent their products as intended for smoking 
cessation. For example, the CEO of Vapeix, in a press release announcing 
its partnership with Next Generation Labs to develop products using syn-
thetic nicotine, stated that “[t]his technology alliance will not only open the 
door for an entirely new, non-tobacco vape market, it aligns us closer to the 
pharmaceutical industry when combining the benefits from Vapeix Powered 
technologies with [synthetic nicotine], which can potentially result in future 
cessation tools for adult smokers.”149 Indeed, in Next Generation Labs’ pa-
tent application for its method of synthesizing nicotine, it wrote that its 
                                                                                                                           
 145 See 21 C.F.R. § 101.93(g)(2)(ii) (2017); Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary 
Supplements Concerning the Effect of the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, 65 
Fed. Reg. 1000, 1013 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). 
 146 Zettler, supra note 140, at 320. 
 147 Cf. January 2017 FDA Clarification, supra note 55, at 2196, 2198–200 (explaining that 
smoking cessation claims are disease claims); Warning Letter from Gerald J. Berg, Dir., FDA Min-
neapolis Dist., to Christian Berkey, CEO, Johnson Creek Enters., LLC (Sept. 8, 2010), https://
wayback.archive-it.org/7993/20161023101826/http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/
WarningLetters/2010/ucm225206.htm [https://perma.cc/JEU8-9XFG] (same). For further discus-
sion of smoking cessation claims as disease claims, see supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
 148 The evidence to support this assertion is mixed, and more research is currently underway. 
Compare Sara Kalkhoran & Stanton A. Glantz, E-cigarettes and Smoking Cessation in Real-
World and Clinical Settings: A Systemic Review and Meta-Analysis, 4 LANCET RESPIRATORY 
MED. 116, 117 (2016) (concluding that “[a]s currently being used, e-cigarettes are associated with 
significantly less quitting among smokers”), with Shu-Hong Zhu et al., E-cigarette Use and Asso-
ciated Changes in Population Smoking Cessation: Evidence from US Current Population Surveys, 
358 BMJ 1, 5 (2017) (finding that “[t]he substantial increase in e-cigarette use among US adult 
smokers was associated with a statistically significant increase in the smoking cessation rate at the 
population level”). 
 149 Press Release, Vapeix, Vapeix and Next Generation Labs Partner to Develop Connected 
Vape System (July 26, 2016), https://www.vapeix.io/press-release-vapeix-next-generation-labs-
partner-develop-connected-vape-system/ [https://perma.cc/9BBS-3YTQ]. 
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product could be used “in vapor for treatment of smoking cessation [sic]  
. . . .”150 
That said, because it is well-known that the FDA considers smoking 
cessation claims to be evidence that any product, including a tobacco-derived 
nicotine product, is a drug, synthetic nicotine product sellers may avoid such 
claims. More common may be representations that synthetic nicotine prod-
ucts are less harmful than tobacco products. One seller’s blog, for example, 
states that their synthetic nicotine products contain “[n]o [c]arcinogenic or 
other tobacco combustion substances.”151 Similarly, another seller of syn-
thetic nicotine products claims “since [its product] is completely synthetic, 
[it] does not contain any of some of the most harmful chemicals typically 
found as contaminants in tobacco-derived nicotine.”152 These kinds of 
statements would be “modified risk” claims if synthetic nicotine products 
were tobacco products—meaning these claims suggest the product reduces 
harm or the risk of tobacco-related disease—and would require FDA ap-
proval.153 But outside of the context of tobacco products, modified risk 
claims are arguably disease claims. Although, on their face, modified risk 
claims are simply comparative claims about differences between synthetic 
nicotine and tobacco-derived nicotine products, they imply that synthetic 
nicotine products reduce the risk of disease and other health harms well 
known to be associated with tobacco and nicotine use.154 
Synthetic nicotine product sellers might also make disease claims un-
related to the diseases associated with the use of traditional tobacco prod-
ucts. For example, one seller of synthetic nicotine products posted on its 
Facebook page a customer review that touted the seller’s “glacier, minty 
menthol” flavor as “definitely something you vape when you’re like sick” 
with a cold because “it opens [you] up.”155 
                                                                                                                           
 150 MICHAEL ARNOLD, NEXT GENERATION LABS, UNITED STATES PATENT APPLICATION 
PUBLICATION #US 2016/0115150 at AI (Apr. 28, 2016). 
 151 Danilo Delos Santos, NTN—A New Generation of Nicotine, HILIQ (Nov. 25, 2016) http://
blog.hiliq.com/ntn-a-new-generation-of-nicotine/ [https://perma.cc/4P69-R8XZ]. 
 152 TFN: Vape E-Liquid, AUSTER, https://www.auster.com/pages/tfn# [https://perma.cc/
2RVK-AHAH]. 
 153 See 21 U.S.C. § 387k (2012). 
 154 Cf. Deeming Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,974, 29,036–39 (May 10, 2016) (explaining why 
smoking cessation claims are not simply behavior modification claims, but are instead disease 
claims). 
 155 SQN, FACEBOOK (July 19, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/sqnvapor/ [https://perma.cc/
K3AG-4LBB] (referring to no longer available video, Alexandra, NKTR Ice E-Liquid—20% Off 
Code, YOUTUBE (July 14, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RCA_42S4IV0); cf. digibomb, 
Vaping While You’re Sick—Weekend Tip, BIG VAPERS (Sept. 2, 2012), https://bigvapers.wordpress.
com/2012/09/02/vaping-while-youre-sick-weekend-tip/ [https://perma.cc/MV7B-NF9K] (asserting 
that, although smoking cigarettes exacerbated their cold symptoms, vaping menthol-flavored e-
liquid “will help soothe” a sore throat and clear out sinuses). 
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But sellers of synthetic nicotine products perhaps most clearly repre-
sent their products as affecting the structure or function of the body. For 
instance, several sellers claim that their synthetic nicotine products have 
“the same biological impact as tobacco derived nicotine.”156 This statement 
is an express structure/function claim by asserting that the product has a 
“biological impact” on the body. Moreover, by comparing synthetic nicotine 
to tobacco-derived nicotine—which is well known to be a stimulant and to 
be addictive—this statement would imply an effect on the structure or func-
tion of the body even without the “biological impact” language. Similarly, 
labeling products with different nicotine strengths, as many companies do, 
or claiming that one benefit of synthetic nicotine is that its flavor profile 
“allow[s] for the addition of a higher nicotine content,” implies that nicotine 
will affect the structure or function of the body.157 If not, why have higher 
strengths of the ingredient, while also asserting that the nicotine lacks any 
taste or odor?158 Even merely claiming nicotine as an ingredient, which all 
sellers of synthetic nicotine products seem to do, can be construed as a 
structure/function claim because of nicotine’s well-known impact on the 
body.159 Indeed, nicotine’s impact on the body is also frequently described 
in warnings and disclaimers on the sellers’ websites.160 
In some circumstances, courts have appeared to conclude that struc-
ture/function claims must have some therapeutic implication to place a prod-
uct within the FDA’s jurisdiction.161 To the extent such a limitation exists, 
however, it is not relevant to the kinds of structure/function claims that sellers 
                                                                                                                           
 156 What Is TFN, supra note 126; see also Santos, supra note 151; TFN: Tobacco Free Nico-
tine, EJUICE DIRECT, https://ejuicedirect.com/collections/tfn-nicotine [https://perma.cc/N6CC-
ACJK]; TFN Liquids, VAPEREV, https://www.vaperev.com/collections/tobacco-free-nicotine-e-
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 157 See TFN Liquids, supra note 156; see, e.g., What Is TFN, supra note 126. 
 158 See, e.g., What Is TFN, supra note 126. 
 159 Cf. Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect of the 
Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, 65 Fed. Reg. 1000, 1013 (Jan. 6, 2000) (ex-
plaining that describing a product with a commonly known drug name, such as “herbal Prozac,” 
can be construed as a disease claim). 
 160 See, e.g., Disclaimers, NEXT GENERATION LABS, http://www.nextgenerationlabs.com/
disclaimers/ [https://perma.cc/GPW6-867V]. 
 161 See, e.g., United States v. Article . . . Consisting of 216 Cartoned Bottles, More or Less, 
Sudden Change, 409 F.2d 734, 742 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Article Consisting of 36 Box-
es, More of Less, Labeled ‘Line Away Temp. Wrinkle Smoother,’ 415 F.2d 369, 372 (3d Cir. 
1969);; United States v. Article of Drug 47 Shipping Cartons, More or Less, ‘Helene Curtis Magic 
Secret’331 F. Supp. 912, 916–17 (D. Md. 1971); Anna Wexler, A Pragmatic Analysis of the Regu-
lation of Consumer Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) Devices in the United States, 
2 J.L. & BIOSCI. 669, 690 (2015); Zettler, supra note 140, at 321. 
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make about their synthetic nicotine products.162 Courts have described struc-
ture/function claims with therapeutic implications to be those claims that sug-
gest that a “product will affect the structure of the body in some medical- or 
drug-type fashion.”163 Claims related to nicotine or a biological impact on the 
body would seem to easily meet this standard of a “drug-type” effect because 
nicotine is the active ingredient in drugs approved for smoking cessation,164 
and also because nicotine’s stimulant effects and additive properties are well 
known and similar to the effects of other drugs.165 
Synthetic nicotine companies, thus, appear to routinely represent their 
products as being intended to mitigate, treat, or prevent disease or to affect 
the structure or function of the body such that their products fall within the 
definition of a drug. Although some companies include statements on their 
website disclaiming any intent that synthetic nicotine products will diag-
nose, treat, cure, or prevent disease, such disclaimers may not be sufficient 
to correct the overall impression companies have created that synthetic nic-
otine products are intended for therapeutic use.166 Moreover, on their face, 
these disclaimers do nothing to dispel the impression that synthetic nicotine 
products are intended to affect the structure or function of the body. The 
                                                                                                                           
 162 As one of the authors has argued elsewhere, it is not clear that courts consider a therapeu-
tic implication to be necessary outside the context of tobacco products. See Zettler, supra note 
140, at 319 n.18; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 162 (2000) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Moreover, the FDA has a long and established history of interpreting pure 
structure/function claims to cause products to fall within the definition of a drug (or the definition 
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Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishing the principle of court defer-
ence to agency interpretation of its governing statute); Regulations on Statements Made for Die-
tary Supplements Concerning the Effect of the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, 
65 Fed. Reg. 1000 (Jan. 6, 2000). 
 163 Sudden Change, 409 F.2d at 742. 
 164 See, e.g., NICODERM LABELING (May 4, 2016), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugs
atfda_docs/label/2016/20165Orig1s038lbl.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2BB-WRTX] (providing an 
example of labeling for a smoking cessation drug). 
 165 Cf. alvSupplement Direct Warning Letter, supra note 140 (describing caffeine powder as a 
drug). 
 166 See, e.g., United States v. Storage Spaces Designated Nos. “8” & “49,” 777 F.2d 1363, 
1366 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985) (concluding that products labeled as ‘‘incense’’ and ‘‘not for drug use’’ 
were drugs under the FDCA where the ‘‘overall circumstances’’ demonstrated the seller’s intent 
that products be used as cocaine substitutes); Latex Surgeons’ Gloves, 799 F. Supp. at 1285 (“All 
of the circumstances surrounding the promotion and sale of the product constitute the ‘intent.’ It is 
not enough for the manufacturer to merely say that he or she did not ‘intend’ to sell a particular 
product as a device.”); Drug Labeled as “Exachol,” 716 F. Supp. at 791 (“FDA is not bound by 
the vendor’s subjective claims of intent . . .. An article intended to be used as a drug will be regu-
lated as a drug . . . even if the product’s labeling states that it is not a drug.”); January 2017 FDA 
Clarification, supra note 55, at 2199, 2203, 2212 (“FDA intends to view such disclaimers skepti-
cally because . . . [i]n most cases . . . FDA does not believe that disclaimers will sufficiently miti-
gate consumer confusion due to the product’s claimed therapeutic benefit.”). 
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FDA, therefore, could reasonably conclude—based on companies’ represen-
tations—that synthetic nicotine products are drugs under the FDCA. 
2. Product Design 
As the above analysis shows, synthetic nicotine products are frequent-
ly marketed with disease or structure/function claims that cause them to fall 
within the definition of a drug. But even if current marketing were modified 
such that sellers’ claims did not make such claims, the design of synthetic 
nicotine products—and in particular the fact that the products contain nico-
tine—also provides evidence that these products are intended to affect the 
structure or function of the body.167  
Indeed, in various circumstances, the FDA has relied on a product’s 
ingredients or other aspects of its design to infer the seller’s intent that it be 
used to affect the structure or function of the body. Perhaps most relevant, 
the FDA made this argument to support its (later vacated) 1996 rule assert-
ing jurisdiction over tobacco products.168 In its jurisdictional statement ac-
companying the 1996 rule, the FDA explained both that nicotine, in fact, 
does affect the structure or function of the body—through its addictive, 
mood-altering, and weight-loss properties—and that tobacco sellers intend 
this outcome.169 The agency based its conclusion about sellers’ intent on 
five central findings, three of which clearly relate to product design: that the 
                                                                                                                           
 167 It is worth noting that merely removing the kinds of claims discussed in Part II.B.1 may 
not be sufficient to demonstrate a new intended use for the products. See supra notes 143–166 and 
accompanying text. For example, in one case involving a prostaglandin derivative for eyelash 
growth, the Federal Circuit seemed to conclude that a company’s past claims that its product af-
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marketed with that product, the court may use such literature to determine the intent in marketing 
the product despite a later disclaimer”). 
 168 See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 125–26 (vacating the 1996 rule); Nicotine in Ciga-
rettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These Products Are Nicotine Delivery Devices Under 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; Jurisdictional Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619, 
44,630 (Aug. 28, 1996). 
 169 Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These Products Are Nicotine 
Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,630. 
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biological effects of nicotine are “so widely known and accepted that it is 
foreseeable to a reasonable seller that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco . . . 
will be used by consumers for [those] purposes”; that sellers “design their 
products to provide consumers with a pharmacologically active dose of nic-
otine”; and “[a]n inevitable consequence of the design . . . is to keep con-
sumers using [the products] by sustaining their addiction to nicotine.”170 
Although a majority of the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that 
the FDA lacked authority to regulate the nicotine in tobacco products as 
drugs in Brown & Williamson, that decision was based on the Court’s con-
clusion that, because of issues unique to tobacco products, Congress did not 
intend for the FDA to regulate tobacco products as drugs.171 The Court did 
not disagree with—or even opine on—the FDA’s use of product design as 
evidence of intended use.172 Brown & Williamson, therefore, does not pre-
clude the FDA from relying on these sources as evidence of intended use. 
Outside of the tobacco products context, although no court has square-
ly faced the issue of whether product design alone can be sufficient evi-
dence of a drug intended use, courts have seemed open to the idea.173 For 
example, in United States v. Article . . . Consisting of 216 Cartoned Bottles, 
More or Less, Sudden Change, a 1969 case about whether a wrinkle cream 
was a cosmetic intended only to affect appearance, or a drug intended to 
affect the structure or function of the skin, the Second Circuit opined that a 
skin cream would be a cosmetic rather than a drug if the seller “avoids . . . 
claiming to affect the structure or function of the skin in some physiological 
. . . way” and “no actual physical effect exists.”174 By stating that the cream 
must have no physical effect in order to escape regulation as a drug, the 
Second Circuit suggested that a product’s design—whether it actually has a 
physical effect—may be sufficient to conclude that the product is a drug.175 
Similarly, in a case about whether a product was a vitamin or a drug, alt-
hough the court did not agree with the FDA’s argument that all products 
with vitamin doses higher than the recommended daily intake were drugs, 
the Second Circuit did not reject the agency’s argument on the ground that 
                                                                                                                           
 170 Id. at 44,660–61. For a discussion of the other two factors—consumer intent and seller 
knowledge of consumer intent—see infra notes 190–210 and accompanying text. 
 171 See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 125–26. 
 172 Id. at 126–61; see also Sottera, 627 F.3d at 893–99. 
 173 Cf. Grossman, supra note 134, at 1127 (“The Second Circuit acknowledged that the 
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 174 Cartoned Bottles, 409 F.2d at 742; see also Zettler, supra note 140, at 321 n.18 (discussing 
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 175 See Sudden Change, 409 F.2d at 742. 
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FDA could not consider product design, and specifically dosage.176 Instead, 
the court rejected the agency’s conclusion that consumers could not be us-
ing such high-dose products “for nutritional purposes.”177 
Moreover, after Brown & Williamson, the FDA has continued to rely 
on aspects of product design as evidence of intended use outside the tobac-
co context in some circumstances.178 For example, in one warning letter, 
sent in 2000 to a company marketing a product called “Rejuvenique,” the 
FDA argued that because the product was designed to “provid[e] electrical 
current to various facial muscles to repeatedly contract them,” it was in-
tended to affect the structure or function of the body—and was a device—
“even if no claims were made for its specific use.”179 In 2003, the FDA sent 
a warning letter to a company marketing “Avacor Hair Care System,” ex-
plaining that it was a drug intended for the treatment and prevention of hair 
loss and for the promotion of hair growth, because of “the claims made . . . 
and the three individual products of which it is composed.”180 As a final 
example, in a 2010 warning letter to the distributor of “Magic Power Cof-
fee,” the agency asserted that the product was intended to prevent or treat 
disease or to affect the structure or function of the body in part because it 
contained an analogue of sildenafil, the active ingredient in Viagra.181 The 
agency noted that Viagra is “well known to have an effect on the structure 
or function of the body.”182 To be clear, warning letters are not final agency 
action, nor are they general policy statements that provide the agency’s offi-
cial thinking or interpretation as a guidance document or regulation 
would.183 Agency interpretations set out in warning letters are not likely to 
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 179 Warning Letter from Larry D. Spears, Acting Dir., Office of Compliance, FDA, to Salton, 
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 180 Warning Letter from Jerome G. Woyshner, Dist. Dir., FDA, to Anthony Imbriolo, Presi-
dent, Glob. Vision Prods., Inc. (Apr. 3, 2003), https://www.casewatch.org/fdawarning/prod/2003/
globalvision.shtml [https://perma.cc/Z334-JG4Q]. 
 181 Warning Letter from Ronald M. Pace, Dist. Dir., FDA, to Peter Erlikh, Vice-President, 
INZ Distributors, Inc. (Aug. 23, 2010) [hereinafter INZ Distributors Warning Letter], 
https://wayback.archive-
it.org/7993/20170112004414/http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/20
10/ucm225432.htm [https://perma.cc/SC46-P7ND]; see also Zettler, supra note 140, at 320 (dis-
cussing the same warning letter). 
 182 INZ Distributors Warning Letter, supra note 181. 
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Letter Procedures”). 
1966 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1933 
receive deference from the courts.184 Nevertheless, these warning letters 
demonstrate that the agency has continued to take the position that a prod-
uct’s design, including its ingredients, can be evidence of intended use, and 
has done so for products other than those containing nicotine. Moreover, the 
FDA recently affirmed the position staked out in these warning letters in its 
January 2017 revisions to the definition of “intended use.”185 
Each of the arguments about product design that the FDA made in its 
1996 jurisdictional statement regarding tobacco products apply with equal 
force to synthetic nicotine products—and possibly with even more force 
given greater scientific knowledge about the effects of nicotine today. As 
was true in 1996, the biological effects of nicotine are widely known and 
accepted, and it is foreseeable to reasonable synthetic nicotine sellers that 
consumers will use the products for those effects.186 Sellers’ disease and 
structure/function claims are evidence of this foreseeability—sellers antici-
pate that consumers will purchase their products for smoking cessation, 
harm reduction, or “biological impact,” and seek to capitalize on that con-
sumer interest through their marketing.187 Sellers also design their synthetic 
nicotine products to provide an effect on the bodies of consumers, as evi-
denced by the presence of nicotine in the formulations, as well as the varia-
tion of nicotine strength in the different formulations.188 These different 
strengths might also be evidence that a product is intended for use in smoking 
cessation or as a treatment for nicotine addiction because the different 
strengths, including the formulations with zero milligrams nicotine, may sug-
gest that the consumers can decrease their nicotine use gradually until they 
use no nicotine at all.189 Finally, just as with tobacco products, nicotine in 
synthetic products is addictive, and can be expected to keep consumers using 
the product (including at least some consumers who intend to quit using, but 
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are unsuccessful). Therefore, the design of synthetic nicotine products, and in 
particular the inclusion of nicotine as an ingredient, alone may be sufficient 
evidence of intent to affect the structure or function of the body or to treat 
disease. 
3. Circumstances of Distribution 
In addition to sellers’ representations about synthetic nicotine and the 
design of the products themselves, the “circumstances surrounding the dis-
tribution” of synthetic nicotine may be evidence that sellers intend these 
products to treat disease or affect the structure or function of the body.190 
Specifically, consumer intent to use synthetic nicotine for its physiological 
effects may provide such evidence. Although consumer intent likely pro-
vides weaker evidence of synthetic nicotine products’ intended use than 
sellers’ representations or the product design, it is worth considering be-
cause, as numerous courts have explained, the FDA is permitted to consider 
“any . . . relevant source” to determine a product’s intended use.191 
Courts have not often faced the question of whether consumer intent is 
relevant to determining the sellers’ intent, likely because firms almost al-
ways make relevant claims about their products. When courts have ad-
dressed this issue, they have concluded that “evidence of consumer intent is 
a ‘relevant source’” for determining intended use when “such evidence is 
strong enough to justify an inference as to the vendors’ intent”—meaning 
that consumers use the product “predominantly and . . . nearly exclusively 
with the appropriate intent.”192 In at least one case, in 2001, U.S. v. Travia, a 
federal judge concluded that this standard was met.193 Travia involved the 
prosecution, under the FDCA, of several individuals who sold nitrous oxide 
(“laughing gas”) in balloons outside a rock concert in Washington, D.C.194 
Because the balloons were unlabeled and unadvertised, the government was 
unable to rely on the sellers’ representations to demonstrate that nitrous ox-
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ide was a drug as defined in the FDCA.195 Nevertheless, Judge Thomas F. 
Hogan of the D.C. District Court agreed with the government’s position that 
the nitrous oxide was a drug because “[l]abeling is not exclusive evidence 
of the sellers’ intent”; rather, intended use may be determined from any 
source.196 In the circumstances involved in Travia, “the environment pro-
vided the necessary information between buyer and seller”; the defendants, 
thus, did not need to label or advertise their product, and the government 
could demonstrate that the nitrous oxide was intended to affect the structure 
or function of the body.197 Furthermore, Congress has arguably approved of, 
or acquiesced to, this interpretation of consumer intent as relevant to the 
intended use inquiry by not amending the definition in the wake of Travia, 
or in the time since the FDA promulgated its regulation defining “intended 
use” broadly enough to encompass consumer intent over forty years ago.198 
Although Judge Hogan characterized the facts of Travia as “obviously 
unique,” synthetic nicotine presents a similarly compelling case for the rel-
evance of consumer intent in determining intended use.199 In its 1996 juris-
dictional statement regarding tobacco, the FDA described consumer intent 
as relevant to its determination that nicotine was a drug.200 The agency not-
ed evidence that “consumers use [tobacco products] predominantly for 
pharmacological purposes,” and “sellers of [tobacco products] know that 
nicotine in their products causes pharmacological effects . . . and that con-
sumers use their products primarily to obtain [these] effects.”201 The agency 
went on to cite data finding that the vast majority of tobacco product users 
(between seventy-seven and ninety-two percent) were addicted to nicotine 
and used tobacco products to satisfy cravings, and that a majority also used 
tobacco for other pharmacological purposes, such as relaxation (seventy 
percent of users aged ten to twenty-two years old).202 Likewise, there is 
good evidence that consumers who use e-cigarettes do so predominantly for 
their pharmacological effects, including their perceived smoking cessation 
benefits.203 Numerous surveys of adult e-cigarette users suggest that the 
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most common reasons for e-cigarette use are to quit or reduce smoking and 
to reduce health risks.204 Youth are less likely to use e-cigarettes to quit 
smoking, and instead—according to the 2016 Surgeon General’s Report—
use e-cigarettes because of curiosity, flavorings/taste, and harm reduction 
compared to cigarettes.205 Harm reduction reflects consumers’ intent to use 
e-cigarettes for their physiological effects, specifically for disease preven-
tion. Although consumers’ interest in e-cigarettes, because of their flavor-
ings or taste likely does not reflect consumers’ intent to achieve pharmaco-
logical effects, curiosity may reflect that intent. Many teens may be curious 
about the physiological effects of nicotine, particularly in light of wide-
spread media coverage and advertising campaigns alluding to these ef-
fects.206 Curiosity or experimentation, for example, is cited as a common 
reason for teens to initiate illicit drug use, a context in which curiosity al-
most certainly reflects an interest in experiencing the physiological effects 
of the product.207 Although the available research focuses on e-cigarettes 
generally, rather than synthetic nicotine products specifically, there is little 
reason to think that synthetic nicotine consumers—who typically are buying 
vaping products identical to those that tobacco-derived nicotine consumers 
buy—would have significantly different motivations.  
The argument that consumer intent is relevant to the question of whether 
synthetic nicotine is a drug is the most controversial argument that we ad-
vance. As Lewis Grossman has explained, “[r]egulated industries contend 
that intended use is established solely by representations made in labeling, 
advertising, and other promotion. Conversely, the FDA maintains that it can 
look to the overall circumstances of distribution, foreseeable use [and] actu-
al use . . . to determine a product’s intended use.”208 Indeed, the extent to 
which the FDA can rely on a company’s knowledge about how consumers 
use its product is an issue at the heart of the controversy over the FDA’s 
now partially delayed 2017 revisions to its regulations defining intended 
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use.209 Nevertheless, even with a narrow view of when consumer intent is 
relevant, there is a reasonable argument that synthetic nicotine presents one of 
the rare circumstances in which consumer intent is probative of sellers’ intent. 
The FDA, then, has three alternative ways of establishing intended 
use—the sellers’ representations about their products, the design of the 
products, and the circumstances of distribution—all of which support the 
conclusion that the FDA can regulate synthetic nicotine products as a drugs. 
As suggested above, there may be stronger or weaker evidence with regard 
to the sellers’ representations in any particular case, but the intentional deci-
sion to use nicotine and consumers’ expectations with regard to the products 
will be constant across synthetic nicotine products (or at least those de-
signed for use as e-liquids). In comparison to tobacco products (Brown & 
Williamson) and e-cigarettes containing tobacco-derived nicotine (Sottera), 
where the unique history of tobacco and the language of the TCA gave the 
courts pause, the arguments for regulating synthetic nicotine products as 
drugs are far more straightforward and compelling. 
III. THE POLICY CASE FOR REGULATING SYNTHETIC  
NICOTINE PRODUCTS AS DRUGS 
Based on the evidence demonstrating that synthetic nicotine products 
are generally intended to address disease or affect the structure or function 
of the body, there is a strong case that the FDA has the legal authority to 
regulate synthetic nicotine products as drugs. The fact that the FDA can 
regulate a particular product, however, does not mean that it will, or should. 
Indeed, the FDA often exercises its discretion not to enforce requirements 
for a variety of reasons, and this may be particularly common for innovative 
products.210 
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In this section, therefore, we explore the question of whether the FDA 
should regulate synthetic nicotine products as drugs. We identify several 
reasons why regulating synthetic nicotine products as drugs would be bene-
ficial and not unreasonably burdensome on industry. We conclude that, not 
only does the FDA have the authority to regulate these products as drugs, it 
would serve the FDA’s public health mission—and the public—for it to do 
so, even when synthetic nicotine products are marketed without explicit 
smoking cessation claims. 
A. Treating Like Products Similarly 
It is a maxim in administrative law and theory that “like cases should 
be treated alike.”211 Such consistency is viewed as fair, and indicative of an 
impartial, rational decision-making process that provides predictability for 
regulated entities.212 This notion of consistency is codified in the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, which permits courts to set aside “arbitrary” and “ca-
pricious” agency decisions213—the paradigmatic example of which is a de-
cision that treats like cases differently.214 
Allowing the subset of synthetically derived e-liquids to evade regula-
tion, while regulating tobacco-derived e-liquids, may unfairly give synthetic 
nicotine products an advantage in the marketplace. Regulating synthetic 
nicotine as a drug would allow the FDA to achieve the policy goal of treat-
ing all nicotine-containing e-cigarettes and e-liquids—regardless of whether 
they are tobacco-derived or not—more similarly than it otherwise could. A 
court is not likely to find that the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously for 
excluding synthetic nicotine products from its scheme for tobacco regula-
tion, because the way the statute and the courts have defined tobacco prod-
ucts gives the FDA a legitimate reason for doing so.215 The FDA generally 
may not have the authority to regulate synthetic nicotine products as tobac-
co products under the TCA because the nicotine is not derived from tobac-
co, and the FDA does not have the authority to regulate as drugs tobacco-
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derived e-liquids that are “customarily marketed” under Sottera.216 Never-
theless, because there is no evidence that synthetic nicotine differs from 
tobacco-derived nicotine in its biological impacts on users, there is no sci-
entific or public health rationale for treating the two categories of products 
differently.217  
The FDA’s schemes for regulating tobacco products and drugs are dis-
tinct, but they parallel each other in important ways. As is true for drugs, the 
FDA may deem tobacco products misbranded if their labeling is false or 
misleading or fails to comply with FDA requirements, such as failing to 
disclose the seller or product ingredients, or failing to include relevant 
warnings.218 Similarly, the FDA may deem both drug and tobacco products 
adulterated if they are contaminated, manufactured in insanitary conditions, 
or manufactured through methods that do not comply with good manufac-
turing practices.219 In short, both regulatory schemes are designed to ensure 
transparency, honesty, and safety. 
Additionally, just as the FDA has a gatekeeping role for drugs, it now 
has such a role for tobacco products. “New tobacco products”—tobacco 
products “not commercially marketed as of February 15, 2007”—must be 
reviewed by the FDA before entering the market.220 The statutory standard 
for FDA authorization of a tobacco product is the public health standard 
discussed in Part I,221 which includes of the agency considering “the risks 
and benefits to the population as a whole, including users and nonusers of 
tobacco products.”222 For drugs, the statutory standard is framed different-
ly—for approval, a drug must be shown to be safe and effective for its in-
tended uses.223 But the difference between the “safe and effective” standard 
for approval for drugs and the “appropriate for the protection of the public 
health” standard for tobacco products may not be as drastic as it seems at 
first glance.224 The FDA has long interpreted the “safe and effective” stand-
ard to mean that the benefits of a drug must outweigh its risks in order for it 
to be approved.225 In making that determination, the FDA, if appropriate, 
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will consider the population health impacts of drugs, including their use in 
intended and unintended users.226 For example, when approving antibiotics 
for human or animal use, the agency generally considers the risk that inap-
propriate use of the drugs will contribute to antibiotic resistance, which is, 
of course, a grave threat to the public health.227As another example, the 
agency required a special risk mitigation program for certain high-dose opi-
oid products in formulations likely to appeal to children, such as lozenges 
and lollipops, in part to prevent accidental exposure in children, who are not 
intended users of the product.228 In other words, for appropriate drugs—
such as synthetic nicotine products—the FDA has the flexibility to consider 
population health factors in its regulatory decision making, similar to those 
it considers for tobacco products.229 
Moreover, to the extent that synthetic nicotine products are being mar-
keted as—or are widely understood by consumers to be—smoking cessa-
tion aids, they should be treated the same as NRTs and other smoking cessa-
tion products that the FDA already regulates as drugs.230 Otherwise, syn-
thetic nicotine companies will be able to make unverified health claims, 
skirt quality control regulations, and take other actions that give them an 
unfair advantage in the marketplace (and potentially threaten public health). 
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B. Protecting Consumers 
The classic rationale for FDA regulation, and its premarket review au-
thority for drugs in particular, is that the agency protects consumers and the 
public health by preventing harmful products—unsafe or ineffective prod-
ucts, or products that do not have a net benefit for the public health—from 
entering the market.231 The need for this consumer protection arises because 
most drugs are “credence goods,” meaning their safety, effectiveness, and 
quality cannot be readily and easily evaluated by patients and prescribers.232 
This results in an information asymmetry. Prescribers and patients cannot 
access full information about the risks and benefits of a drug, and thus can-
not make decisions that will force harmful or ineffective drugs from the 
marketplace.233 Although other markets may have similar characteristics, 
the potentially serious consequences of taking harmful or ineffective drugs 
is cited to justify the FDA’s role in this context.234 
This rationale for the FDA’s drug authorities applies to synthetic nico-
tine products just as it applies to many traditional drugs. Consumers are not 
likely to be able to assess the veracity of sellers’ claims related to smoking 
cessation, harm reduction, and the biological impact of synthetic nicotine, 
nor will consumers be able to determine which products are more likely to 
pose risks or produce the benefits or biological effects that the consumer is 
seeking. Additionally, allowing synthetic nicotine products on the market 
without any FDA vetting may have negative, long-term consequences for 
consumers. For instance, unverified health claims may drive people towards 
using e-cigarettes with synthetic nicotine to quit smoking instead of using 
other therapies that may be more effective and pose fewer risks to cardio-
vascular and respiratory health. Similar to e-cigarettes with tobacco-derived 
nicotine, synthetic nicotine products may also serve as a pathway to ciga-
rette use, increasing the risk that individuals who would not otherwise 
smoke will do so.235 
More practically, the 2016 Deeming Rule lays out the public health 
case for applying the FDA’s tobacco products authorities to e-cigarettes, 
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including tobacco-derived nicotine e-liquids.236 Because of the parallels 
between the regulatory regime for tobacco products and that for drugs, 
much of the same reasoning supports applying the FDA’s drug authorities to 
synthetic nicotine. That is, regulating synthetic nicotine products as drugs 
would serve the same consumer protection purposes that regulating other e-
cigarette products under the scheme for tobacco products does. 
One major public health concern is that e-cigarettes appeal, and are 
widely available, to adolescents and young adults, who are at an age of par-
ticular susceptibility to initiation of nicotine use and addiction.237 Adding to 
this concern, FDA research, conducted with the Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC), found an 800% increase in e-cigarette use among high school stu-
dents from 2011–2014, with e-cigarettes being the most commonly used 
tobacco product among that age group.238 Even though e-cigarettes are like-
ly a less harmful way to use nicotine than smoking, nicotine use itself car-
ries risks for the user, and particularly for minors—including interfering 
with neurological development, leading to long-term cognitive and mental 
health consequences.239 For e-cigarettes that are tobacco products, the FDA 
has several tools to address this public health issue, such as prohibiting the 
sale of e-cigarettes to minors, requiring certain warnings on product label-
ing, prohibiting characterizing flavors that attract youth users, and consider-
ing the potential impact on minors’ use in the premarket review process.240 
If synthetic nicotine products are not regulated by the FDA, however, it may 
create an easy pathway for minors to access e-liquids and e-cigarettes that 
they otherwise would not have, thwarting the public health goals of the 
Deeming Rule.241 If, on the other hand, synthetic nicotine products were 
regulated as drugs, the FDA could take steps to make such products less 
accessible to minors. For example, if synthetic nicotine products were sold 
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over-the-counter (“OTC”) without a prescription, the FDA likely could re-
quire that synthetic nicotine products only be sold to adults OTC, similar to 
what the agency required for Plan B, the emergency contraceptive drug.242 
As with tobacco products, the FDA could also require warnings on the la-
beling for synthetic nicotine products and consider minors’ use in its pre-
market review.243 
Regulation can also help ensure that e-cigarettes are not more harmful 
than necessary. For instance, the FDA is currently looking into the issue of 
e-cigarette battery safety. E-cigarette battery explosions have caused grue-
some and severe injuries in some cases.244 Additionally, poor manufacturing 
practices could allow metals and other contaminants to enter e-cigarette 
aerosols,245 and some e-liquid flavors may include ingredients that are par-
ticularly toxic (e.g., diacetyl).246 The Deeming Rule envisions the FDA’s 
premarket review of tobacco products as a means to protect consumers by 
preventing the sale of riskier products. Again, however, if synthetic nicotine 
products avoid any FDA regulation, this goal may be thwarted and consum-
ers may have easy access to unreasonably risky products. If synthetic nico-
tine products were regulated as drugs, however, the FDA could use its pre-
market review authority for drugs to address such concerns. 
C. Encouraging Research and Innovation 
Although the FDA is often described as serving a consumer protection 
function, its premarket review authority also serves an important function in 
motivating research that produces the information necessary to assess the 
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benefits and risks of products.247 Producing scientifically sound information 
about the effects of products is expensive and time-consuming.248 Without a 
requirement that sellers demonstrate to the FDA that their drugs are safe and 
effective, or that marketing their tobacco products is appropriate for the pro-
tection of the public health, companies are not likely to rigorously study the 
effects of their products.249 The dietary supplement industry provides a sali-
ent example of the consequences of restricting the FDA’s regulatory role. 
The claims that sellers make about dietary supplements, which are not sub-
ject to the FDA’s premarket review, are rarely supported by rigorous scien-
tific evidence.250 
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Using FDA oversight to motivate research into the effects of e-
cigarettes and other novel nicotine products is a particularly important pub-
lic health goal. There is significant hope (and, perhaps, hype) about the po-
tential for e-cigarette use to reduce the harm associated with the use of tra-
ditional tobacco products, such as cigarettes—which are still the leading 
cause of preventable death in the United States. Although e-cigarettes seem 
to be less harmful than cigarettes, research, and particularly long-term stud-
ies, are needed to understand whether they provide a net benefit to the pub-
lic health, what e-cigarette characteristics and marketing practices are likely 
to maximize public health benefits, and what unique harms (if any) may be 
associated with e-cigarette use.251 Likewise, such research will be needed 
for other novel nicotine products that may enter the market.252 Indeed, the 
FDA asserted that motivating research was one purpose served by its deci-
sion to promulgate the Deeming Rule.253 As the FDA explained, applying 
the agency’s tobacco authorities to e-cigarettes “will provide FDA with crit-
ical information regarding the heath risks of the products,” which “is partic-
ularly important given the addictiveness of nicotine and the toxicity associ-
ated with tobacco products.”254 
Relatedly, regulating synthetic nicotine products as drugs may promote 
high-value innovation—in that it would require sellers to produce products 
for which there is reasonable certainty that the products will do what sellers 
claim they will do.255 That is, regulating synthetic nicotine products as 
drugs provides the opportunity for the FDA to not only encourage research, 
but also incentivize the development and sale of innovative synthetic nico-
tine products that deliver on industry’s promise of a safe, or at least less 
harmful, way to use nicotine, just as the FDA can do for those e-cigarettes 
that are tobacco products. FDA gatekeeping serves, as one scholar has ex-
plained, as an “anti-lemon” mechanism.256 
If, however, synthetic nicotine products are not subject to any FDA 
oversight, it is likely that synthetic nicotine will come to dominate the e-
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cigarette market. If the majority of e-cigarettes fall outside FDA regulation, 
this result would be a lost opportunity to motivate industry to conduct rig-
orous research to answer the important questions about their products and to 
incentivize the creation of innovative e-cigarettes that truly reduce harm. 
But regulating synthetic nicotine as a drug would retain the information and 
innovation-producing benefits of FDA oversight—because sellers of syn-
thetic nicotine products would need to produce rigorous scientific evidence 
about their products to obtain FDA authorization for marketing. 
D. Considerations for Implementation 
To realize many of these policy benefits, it is important that the FDA 
thoughtfully implement its regulation of synthetic nicotine products as 
drugs. Perhaps most obviously, the suggestion that synthetic nicotine prod-
ucts be regulated under the FDA’s drug authorities is likely to produce ob-
jections that such regulation would be unduly burdensome, possibly even 
eliminating the burgeoning synthetic nicotine industry altogether. Indeed, 
these are common concerns about the FDA’s decision to deem e-cigarette 
products subject to its tobacco authority, and the FDA’s drug authorities are 
likely to be viewed as at least as onerous, if not more so, than its tobacco 
authorities.257  
The FDA’s drug authorities do impose burdens on regulated industry, 
including the often long process of developing safety and effectiveness in-
formation for approval, as well as labeling, promotion, and manufacturing 
requirements. To the extent that e-cigarettes or e-liquids, including synthetic 
nicotine, hold real promise for reducing the harm associated with tobacco 
and nicotine use, unreasonable burdens on industry should concern industry 
and consumer advocate stakeholders alike. The key, then, may be finding a 
way to achieve the policy benefits of regulating synthetic nicotine as a drug 
while assuring that the burdens are not unreasonable. Although we do not 
claim to identify the solution for achieving this balance (nor do we claim 
that the burden of regulation is the only important implementation question) 
we note that there are several ways that the FDA might streamline the pro-
cess to market for synthetic nicotine products while preserving the benefits 
of regulating synthetic nicotine as a drug.258  
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One option might be for the FDA to exercise its discretion not to enforce 
certain drug requirements applicable to synthetic nicotine products. Exercis-
ing enforcement discretion is a tool that the agency has used to tailor its regu-
latory scheme for a number of other innovative technologies, including mo-
bile medical apps, fecal microbiota transplantation, and certain genetic 
tests.259 Similarly, for synthetic nicotine products, if the scientific evidence 
supported such an approach, the FDA might decide not to enforce premarket 
review requirements for products that were not marketed as smoking cessa-
tion aids and were substantially equivalent to legally marketed tobacco prod-
ucts (with the only difference being synthetic nicotine in place of tobacco-
derived nicotine). Such an approach, if consistent with how the FDA treated 
e-cigarettes regulated as a tobacco product and supported by sound scientific 
evidence, may enable synthetic nicotine products to reach the market quickly 
without sacrificing other benefits or goals of FDA regulation. 
As Eric Lindblom has suggested for e-cigarettes subject to the FDA’s to-
bacco-related jurisdiction, another option would be to promise expedited 
premarket review (and presumptive approval) to companies that agreed to 
take actions likely to reduce potential negative public health consequences 
associated with e-cigarette use.260 For example, companies could agree to 
market their products only to adults who are currently smokers, to include 
labeling or warnings explaining the dangers of dual use, and to conduct cer-
tain types of postmarket surveillance. Although this approach may raise con-
cerns about the FDA’s ability to enforce such industry commitments, it may 
be an appropriate option if the potential of e-cigarettes, including synthetic 
nicotine products, to provide significant public health benefits is demonstrat-
ed.261  
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Finally, particularly because it seems likely that synthetic nicotine 
products would be marketed as OTC drugs, rather than drugs requiring a 
prescription, the FDA also might have options for allowing the marketing of 
synthetic nicotine products without requiring a product-by-product review.262 
The vast majority of OTC drugs are marketed pursuant to an “OTC Mono-
graph”—a regulation promulgated by the FDA that establishes the condi-
tions under which the FDA will consider a drug to be generally recognized 
as safe and effective, and not misbranded, such that it can be marketed 
without premarket approval.263 Although the OTC Monographs are general-
ly available only to drugs that were marketed when the FDA began its sys-
tematic review of OTC drugs in 1972, there is a mechanism for adding lat-
er-introduced drugs to the monograph process.264 Through this mechanism, 
it might be possible to create an OTC Monograph for synthetic nicotine 
products, once more data is available about the conditions under which syn-
thetic nicotine products are safe and effective. 
This list does not exhaust the options that the FDA may have for re-
ducing the burdens of regulation on synthetic-nicotine-product sellers, and 
determining what approaches may be appropriate deserves more detailed 
consideration than this Article can provide. But these examples do show 
that claims that FDA regulation necessarily will unreasonably burden the 
synthetic nicotine industry are not persuasive. Moreover, although all bur-
dens associated with FDA regulating synthetic nicotine products as drugs 
cannot be eliminated, importantly those burdens may have numerous bene-
fits, including enabling the agency to treat like products similarly, protect-
ing consumers, incentivizing rigorous studies of synthetic nicotine, and en-
couraging beneficial innovation in this space. 
CONCLUSION 
The current regulatory gap for synthetic nicotine products—wherein to-
bacco-derived nicotine products are subject to FDA regulation and synthetic 
nicotine products are not—may prompt more and more companies to “mak[e] 
business choices on the basis of the difference between the two regulatory 
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domains.”265 Such “regulatory arbitrage” serves no public health purpose and 
threatens to undermine the FDA’s newly announced “comprehensive plan for 
tobacco and nicotine regulation . . . .”266 There is, however, a fix available: 
the FDA can regulate synthetic nicotine products as drugs. This solution is not 
perfect; ideally, all nicotine-containing products (or at least all nicotine-
containing e-liquids) would be subject to the same regulatory scheme, regard-
less of the source of the nicotine. But, as demonstrated in this Article, this 
approach is legally sound and, with thoughtful implementation, would pro-
mote the public’s interest in sound regulation and consumer protection, with-
out sacrificing innovation. The FDA is poised to begin a promising new phase 
of tobacco and nicotine regulation; synthetic nicotine products, if properly 
regulated as drugs, could play a key role in the FDA’s effort to transition cur-
rent smokers to less harmful nicotine products. 
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